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Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
The overarching focus of this thesis is knowledge production in International 
Relations (IR), focusing in particular on feminism. It deals with a debate between 
neo-feminism and ‟traditional‟ IR-feminism that has developed over the past few 
years in Great Britain. This debate concerns the relationship between feminism 
and mainstream IR, and whether or not gender should be distinguished from 
feminist theory and added as a variable to mainstream IR theories. Neo-feminist 
scholars claim that feminism has played out its role; that committing to a study of 
women and femininity is biased and misrepresentative. They want to distract 
gender as a variable that can be used in combination with non-feminist theories to 
study both men and women; masculinities and femininities. Feminist scholars of 
IR, however, claim that neo-feminism reproduces heteronormativity and 
patriarchal structures in I/international R/relations, and that the critical project of 
feminism has far from reached its end. This debate is important, not just for the 
future of feminist theorizing, but for International Relations in general, since it 
brings to the fore questions about neutrality, objectivity, knowledge production, 
power relations, and a historical exclusion of women and feminist scholars from 
IR. Methodologically, I approach this debate from a poststructural perspective, 
arguing for the importance of recognizing the productive capacity of discourse 
and language, and arguing against any assumption that IR as an academic field is 
outside of the discursive production of the subject.     
 In order to make explicit the arguments in this debate, its discursive 
formation and its effects on the study of international politics, I conduct an 
internal discourse analysis based on Brian C. Schmidt‟s conceptualization of this 
method as advantageous for studying the development of a specific debate or 
academic field. But my main theoretical and methodological framework is based 
on (feminist) poststructuralism; the discourse analysis is thus mainly informed by 
the writings of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Chris Weedon. Theoretically, I 
develop a framework based on three concepts: performativity, heteronormativity, 
and power. Judith Butler develops the concept of performativity in order to show 
that gender is not a noun that can be deployed to describe a specific sex. Rather, 
both gender and sex are performed; constructs of a heterosexual matrix that 
produces the subject in terms of gender/sex/desire coherence. Suggesting that 
gender is always performed destabilizes the presumed natural link between sex 
and gender, whereby sex is exposed as just as constructed as gender. Through 
regulatory practices and repetitive acts, both gender and sex are always 
performed, suggesting that there is no pre-discursive subject existing outside, or 
previous to, these acts. Related to Butler‟s performativity is heteronormativity, a 
concept that Samuel A. Chambers and Terrell Carver (2008) develops from 
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Butler‟s heterosexual matrix. In short, heteronormativity is the process whereby 
the heterosexual subject becomes established as „normal‟ and „natural‟. The 
normative in heteronormativity expresses the regulatory and normalizing function 
of norms; the restrictions set out by a heterosexual matrix that both requires and 
reproduces the masculine/feminine binary. Heteronormativity establishes the 
heterosexual subject, heterosexual sexuality and desires as normal, thus rendering 
other subject positions, other sexualities and desires as deviant, unnatural, and 
even unintelligible. Performativity and heteronormativity suggest a poststructural 
understanding of the discursive production of the subject. Recognizing the subject 
as discursively produced opens up possibilities for subverting a heteronormative 
discourse that continue to exclude non-normative subjects. Subverting 
heteronormativity is more than just exposing and questioning the construction of 
gender; it is a repetitive act whereby the natural foundation of heterosexuality is 
exposed, disturbed, and weakened. In relation to performativity and 
heteronormativity, and of relevance for my analysis, is the concept of power, 
which I here understand in Foucauldian terms; i.e. as productive rather than 
repressive. This means recognizing that power is everywhere, in every relation 
and on a multiplicity of levels, and that gender can never be neutral since it is both 
a product of power/discourse relations, and productive of the gendered subject.  
 In the analysis of the feminist debate in IR, I deploy these concepts 
to look at how gender is performed and how heteronormativity is reproduced in 
this debate; what kind of truth claims that are made in the texts; and what 
connection these claims have to power and the center of International Relations. 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate why this debate has come about; 
what forms of knowledge that are produced; and why particular forms of gendered 
knowledge is (re)produced.  
 I analyze five texts from the neo-feminist body, and four texts from 
IR-feminist authors; texts that I have chosen as representative of the main 
arguments in the debate. My analysis shows that neo-feminism to a large extent is 
both informed by, and (re)productive of, heteronormativity. By reducing gender to 
an explanatory instrument and sex to measurable categories, a heterosexual matrix 
based on the coherence of gender/sex/desire is established as true. By adding 
gender to conventional theories of international relations, a „gender-neutral‟ 
research is presumed to be possible. In effect, the productive capacity of language 
and discourse, and the power structures that legitimize certain types of truth 
claims while discrediting others remain hidden behind a logocentic understanding 
of language as descriptive and representative. Based on this reading of neo-
feminism, I propose that this approach is not „neo‟ to feminism in the sense that 
e.g. neo-realism is „neo‟ to realism, i.e. as a development of the original theory. 
Rather, I suggest that neo-feminism is better conceptualized as post-feminism, in 
the sense that e.g. postmodernism is „post‟ to modernism: as a critique, or even 
rejection, of the original approach.     
 The texts that represent IR-feminism advocate a continued 
commitment to feminism as a critique of established epistemologies and 
methodologies, and as a theoretical understanding of international politics that 
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does not reproduce patriarchal structures, heteronormativity, or exclusion. The 
arguments put forth by these authors contain strong possibilities for subverting 
heteronormativity – and IR as a coherent academic field. In rejecting conventional 
methodology and research agendas, and established ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, IR-feminism can, through a self-positioning at the 
margins of what is considered International Relations, voice a critique and disturb 
the inside/outside distinction that produces IR as a coherent academic discipline. 
This is a form of normative critique that questions the limits of what is knowable 
and of what is considered „valid research‟. Feminist epistemologies and 
methodologies are often discredited within a field like IR that promotes traditional 
research values such as objectivity, neutrality, validity and replicability. But rather 
than claiming space by adapting to these values, IR-feminism continues to disturb 
these assumptions about „research‟ and continues to produce knowledge that does 
not conform to prevailing norms.  
 My intention with this thesis is twofold; firstly, I want to show that 
IR is productive of the reality that it claims to merely describe; and secondly, I 
want to argue for a continued commitment to feminist epistemologies and 
methodologies. The purpose of my analysis is to disturb assumptions about 
„gender-neutral‟ knowledge claims, and to show how language is always 
productive, but never representative. Any claims of IR being „outside‟ of the 
discursive production of subjects, identities – and the human – are reproductive of 
a knowledge that continues to exclude non-heteronormative lives from the 
ontological reality.   
 
 
Keywords: International Relations; feminism; heteronormativity; performativity; 
knowledge production  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Words: 19 736 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past twenty years feminists within the field of International Relations 
(IR) have offered ostensive critique towards conventional IR theories such as 
realism and liberalism. They have revealed the inherent masculine 
conceptualization of the international society and the maintenance of patriarchal 
structures within the field. In many respects, feminist IR theorists have 
contributed immensely to the study of international relations, yet they remain 
marginalized and often excluded from the mainstream production of knowledge 
on international politics. Over the past years a debate has developed between two 
strands of feminism: „traditional‟ IR-feminists and „neo-feminists‟, where the first 
group argues for a continued commitment to feminist epistemology and 
methodology, and the second group makes claims for a centralization of gender 
studies without any feminist agenda. This thesis focuses on that debate. 
In 1997, J. Ann Tickner wrote an article that has since shaped the 
feminist debate in International Relations: You Just Don‟t Understand: Troubled 
Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists. Here, she shows how feminist 
epistemologies and methodologies continue to be marginalized and excluded from 
the mainstream of IR, and how there is a constant miscommunication between 
feminists and IR theorists. The response that Tickner got from IR theorist Robert 
O. Keohane is telling of the view on feminism held by many mainstream IR 
theorists:  
 
Keohane goes on to imply that Tickner has yet to convince 
him of the worthiness of feminist scholarship. In this 
process, he reiterates that Tickner, and feminist scholars 
generally, should aspire to harmonize with present standards, 
which are tautologically identified as the (only) legitimate 
grounds for making authoritative judgments and acceptable 
claims to IR knowledge production. (Zalewski 2006:56) 
 
  Cynthia Weber similarly shows how IR theorists tends to push 
feminist scholars to adapt to conventional IR standards: “the gender variable 
simply expresses what feminists study – or, … what feminists ought to study, 
which is gender” (Weber 2001:83, italics in original). But gender is here detached 
from any feminist agenda, and generalized to simply mean femininity and 
masculinity: “it makes feminism and feminists manageable because it places them 
within one reasonable realm – gender – and places gender itself within the 
confines of a variable. Now IR scholars can look at gender as a discrete set of 
relationships that they can explore qualitatively or quantitatively” (Weber 
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2001:83). The consequences of these views on feminism in IR is that either IR-
feminists have to abandon any feminist agenda, any normative aspiration and any 
alternative knowledge production and adapt to conventional IR epistemologies 
and methodologies; or they remain marginalized and „misunderstood‟, with their 
research always questioned and criticized for lacking validity and relevance.   
In recent years, a debate between what Zalewski (2007) refers to as 
neo-feminists, and so called „traditional‟ IR-feminists (henceforth IR-feminists) 
has developed in Great Britain around this question of adaptation. What is at stake 
is whether IR-feminists should consciously position themselves at the margins in 
relation to „orthodox‟ IR theories1 and issues, keeping with their „alternative‟ 
modes of research and knowledge production; or if they should claim a central 
position, adopting – and gendering – mainstream IR ontology, epistemologies, 
and modes of analysis. The call for a central positioning is made by the neo-
feminists, who advocate an analysis of gender freed from its “feminist 
commitments” (Zalewski 2007:303). According to the IR-feminists, neo-feminism 
reproduces heteronormativity within the field of IR by working with, rather than 
against, existing power hierarchies and thereby sacrificing their feminist 
commitments for a „gender-neutral‟ analysis. The neo-feminists, on the other 
hand, claim that IR-feminism is “an increasingly ineffective means of producing 
comprehensive and effective gender analysis, because of the relative absence of 
attention paid in this literature to the injustices suffered by men within 
international politics” (ibid).  
The theoretical foundation of this thesis, as well as my own 
theoretical preconceptions, is found in Judith Butler‟s writings. It is – 
predominantly – her theoretical and philosophical discussions that will guide my 
analysis. According to Butler (2004a), the naturalization of binaries such as 
man/woman, sex/gender, and nature/culture leads to an internalization of sexual 
difference that becomes so closely linked to the subject self that the mere notion 
of a different conceptualization threatens the very foundation of that subject. She 
proposes a theory to deconstruct these binaries and the discourse on 
heterosexuality that they are connected to. The overall aim of her theory is to 
expand the scope of what is considered „human‟; to open up for a culture where 
sex, gender, and sexuality is not bound up in binaries which establish hierarchies 
of norms and knowledges that naturalize certain forms of sexuality and gender 
identities while effectively repressing others; and where the sex is analyzed in 
terms of „becoming‟ and thus linked to the becoming of gender, rather than being 
seen as a biologically fixed truth (Butler 2006). Two Butlerian concepts are 
central to this thesis: heteronormativity and performativity. Along with a 
discussion on Foucauldian power and feminist poststructuralism, these concepts 
                                                          
1
 Jill Steans uses the term „orthodox‟ IR-theories, referring to realism and neo-realism (Steans 
1998: chapter 2). J. Ann Tickner uses the term “methodologically conventional IR scholars” with 
which she refers to “realists, neorealists, neoliberals, peace researchers, behavioralists, and 
empiricists committed to data-based methods of testing” (Tickner 1997:613). I will henceforth 
mainly use the term mainstream IR-theories – or refer to the center of IR – in which I include the 
theoretical and methodological approaches that Steans and Tickner label as orthodox or 
conventional.    
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will be presented and discussed in the Theory Overview-chapter. In the 
Methodology-chapter I will discuss epistemological and methodological 
implications of this thesis, and present the methods I will use in my analysis. 
Chapters 4 to 6 consist of an internal discourse analysis of the debate between IR-
feminists and neo-feminists, where I will make explicit the main arguments in the 
debate, and discuss why these particular forms of knowledge are produced. 
 
 
1.1 Research Aim 
 
In 1996, Adam Jones published an article called Does “Gender” Make the World 
Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations, where he attempts to 
alleviate „gender‟ from its feminist commitments, arguing that feminism‟s focus 
on women and femininity makes it an inadequate theory for studying gender in 
International Relations, and that a satisfactory analysis of men and masculinities is 
missing from the feminist project. Following this reasoning, R. Charli Carpenter 
published an article in 2002 called Gender Theory in World Politics: 
Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?, where she suggests that although 
feminists‟ focus on women‟s oppression and their commitment to an 
emancipatory agenda are commendable qualities, „gender‟ should not be 
conceptualized solely in terms of „woman‟ and „femininity‟. Rather, it should be 
added as an “explanatory instrument” to mainstream IR theories (Carpenter 
2002:161). Mary Caprioli similarly argues for an incorporation of „gender‟ into 
conventional IR theories in Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A 
Critical Analysis (2004). These articles sparked off a debate about how gender 
and feminism should be conceptualized within International Relations, with a 
dividing line between IR-feminists and neo-feminists (with the authors outlined in 
this paragraph representing the neo-feminist body). This debate considers what 
epistemological claims should be made by feminism; if we are stronger at the 
margins or at the center; if gender is as much about masculinity as it is about 
femininity; and if power is best reversed by playing along or by breaking all the 
rules.  
 The aim of this thesis is to critically analyze how discourses on 
gender inform – and are produced by – this debate; how and why 
heteronormativity is (re)produced; and which subversive possibilities are present. 
My intention is to make explicit how gender is performed in neo-feminist and IR-
feminist texts, and to expose and critique hierarchical oppositions and presumed 
borders which maintain power relations and preserve distinct modes of knowledge 
production. This is thus not just a matter of deconstructing feminism, but of 
deconstructing the limits of what is presumed to be a coherent academic discipline 
called International Relations.  
 My research questions as presented below, have been developed in 
line with the distinction between first-order factual questions (which deal with the 
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“constitution of the factual framework itself” (Hansen 2006:22)), and second-
order factual questions (which counter the answers one obtains from the first 
questions) made by Lene Hansen: “It is a key goal of discourse analysis to show 
how these first-order facts are dependent upon a particular discursive framing of 
the issue in question and that this framing has political effects” (Hansen 2006:22). 
Following a poststructural understanding of language, power and discourse, and 
the production of the subject, my research questions belong to the first-order 
factual questions, as they deal with the production of knowledge within the debate 
between neo-feminism and IR-feminism. This means that my analysis focuses on 
exposing how discourses on gender and heteronormativity simultaneously inform 
and are (re)produced in the debate between neo-feminism and IR-feminism; it 
also means an analysis of why certain forms of knowledge are produced and 
certain truth claims are made.   
 
 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
 
1. How do discourses on gender and heteronormativity inform the debate 
between neo-feminism and IR-feminism, and how is heteronormativity 
(re)produced in this debate? 
2. What forms of (gendered) knowledge are produced in neo-feminist and IR-
feminist texts, and what are the effects of these knowledges on the subject? 
3. Why is heteronormativity and certain forms of gender subjectivities 
(re)produced in the debate between neo-feminism and IR-feminism, and 
why do these two approaches conceptualize gender and heteronormativity 
differently? 
 
 
1.2 Material and Demarcations 
 
The debate between IR-feminism and neo-feminism is of great impact for 
International Relations in large. Arguments to abandon feminist commitments and 
to advocate a gender-neutral analysis where gender is just another analytical 
variable are put against arguments to remain committed to feminist theory and 
research agendas. Hence, the course of this debate will strongly impact how 
feminism and gender analysis will develop in – and in relation to – International 
Relations. This is why I think that this debate is of particular interest for feminism 
in general and IR-feminism in particular. This is also why I limit myself to an 
internal discourse analysis of this debate. In Chapter 4 I will outline specifically 
which authors and texts that I will analyze. As will be discussed in the 
Methodology-chapter, an internal discourse analysis means analyzing the 
discursive development of a delimited field rather than looking for developmental 
explanations in external events. According to Brian C. Schmidt (1998), theoretical 
debates are to a larger extent shaped by the contents of the debate and the 
academic field within which it is articulated than by external political and social 
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events, and an analysis of these debates are therefore more explanatory of a fields 
development than an analysis of this fields contextual surroundings. Furthermore, 
this demarcation will help direct the research process and the text analysis to the 
core of the subject under study: knowledge production within feminist IR theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
2 Theory Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
Judith Butler has written over ten books, a significant amount of articles, and she 
is one of the most acknowledged authors within both feminist and queer theory. 
Hence, her theoretical and philosophical contribution to the academic world is 
immense. However, for the purpose of this thesis I have chosen to focus on two of 
her books: Gender Trouble (2006) from 1990, which is regarded as Butler‟s 
primary work on gender studies and which has had a huge impact on queer theory; 
and Undoing gender from 2004, which further develops the concepts presented in 
Gender Trouble and deals with more current political events. I have chosen to 
base my theoretical framework on these works because in these Butler discusses 
the two concepts most relevant for my analysis: heteronormativity and 
performativity. Briefly, I focus on these concepts because they expose 
assumptions about a normative heterosexuality and the normalization of gendered 
binaries. They also offer subversive possibilities that can be used to develop IR-
feminist theory. I will outline and explain these concepts and their relevance for 
this thesis further ahead in this chapter. 
Samuel Chambers and Terrell Carver‟s book Judith Butler and 
Political Theory (2008) is my third main theoretical source concerning 
heteronormativity and performativity. Here, Chambers and Carver discuss Judith 
Butler‟s theories in relation to political theory and how her concepts can be used 
in a political theoretical analysis (as well as why they should be). Their 
conceptualization of heteronormativity and performativity in relation to political 
theory provides the framework for applying these concepts to IR-feminist theory.  
Much of Butler‟s writings draw upon psychoanalytic theory and 
French philosophy, and she discusses issues such as the psychic formation of the 
subject, the Oedipus complex and the related incest taboo, embodiment, Lacanian 
notions of the Symbolic, Freudian conceptualization of sexuality and so on; and 
she draws upon authors such as Monique Wittig, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Friedrich Nietzsce, Jacques Lacan, and, as one of her most frequent sources, 
Michel Foucault. With the exception of Foucault, I will not closer discuss these 
authors, as they are not immediately related to the topic of this thesis. Thus, I will 
not do a separate reading of the writings discussed by Butler in order to reinterpret 
her original reading of these texts. The reason for this demarcation is that Butler is 
my main analytical resource: my intention is to use her concepts as analytical 
tools, not as objects of analysis.
2
  
                                                          
2
 However, I do admit that the lines between the two will at times be blurry and perhaps I will even 
have to grant that there is no clear line between them. Especially when the writings I attempt to 
analyze also make use of Butler and/or the concepts outlined below. Heteronormativity have, for 
example, been discussed and conceptualized by a variety of authors, but my usage of the term in 
this thesis is limited to the conceptualization made by Chambers and Carver. Furthermore, the fact 
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 In order to analyze the (re)production of (gendered) knowledge and 
heteronormativity, and situate this debate in the larger field of IR, I need to make 
use of the concept of power. But power is not a given, already made concept. It 
needs to be specified. Based on my readings of Butler and my own theoretical 
presuppositions I will use a Foucauldian conceptualization of power in my 
analysis. In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978), Foucault conceptualizes 
power in terms of power/discourse relations in an attempt to move past a juridical 
understanding of power to an analysis of power that is at play in all relations, 
where the common link between power and the law is revealed as a mere 
concealment of the actual power relations in society. I am focusing on 
Foucauldian power, firstly because of his influence on Butler and many other 
poststructuralist feminists, and, secondly, due to his writings on discourse 
analysis, and his analysis of the relation between power, discourse, and 
knowledge production.  
 The conceptualization of heteronormativity, performativity, and 
power that will be presented below will show a close alignment between these 
concepts and poststructuralist theory. In Feminist Practice & Poststructuralist 
Theory (1987), Chris Weedon develops a feminist poststructuralism that 
advocates discourse analysis as the most compelling method for analyzing 
heteronormativity, power relations, and the discursive production of the subject. I 
will in this chapter give a brief outline of the theoretical implications of feminist 
poststructuralism. However, for the purpose of this thesis, poststructuralism will 
be more of a methodological consideration than a theoretical one. Its 
methodological strengths will be discussed in chapter 3. In short, poststructuralist 
theory is a rejection of the Symbolic; of pre-social and pre-cultural structures 
determining behaviors and outcomes, subject positions and accessible identities. It 
is not a coherent theoretical framework that sets out to investigate, explain, and 
narrate „reality‟; it does not pretend that research leads to truths. It works at and 
with the limits of knowledge and language, and is thus effective, both 
theoretically and methodologically, for deconstructing discourses and power 
relations.  
 
 
2.1 Performativity 
 
In much feminist theory the anatomical sex is distinguished from the cultural 
gender in a classical nature/culture dichotomy. Since Simone de Beauvoir‟s 
statement “one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one” (Beauvoir, quoted 
in Butler 2006:11), the social construction of gender is well established; 
femininity is cultural, not biological. But the sex remains biological, natural, and 
precedes the becoming of the gender. An anatomically correct woman becomes a 
feminine gender and an anatomically correct man becomes a masculine gender. 
                                                                                                                                                               
that both Butler and Foucault have influenced some of the texts in my analysis is an advantage 
rather than a disadvantage since it connects the theoretical approach with the analysis, and lends 
support to the arguments put forth in this thesis.  
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So what about the sexes that are not anatomically correct, or the man that 
becomes feminine and vice versa? According to Butler (2006), sex is not a pre-
cultural given; it is as fraught with meaning and construction as gender is, and one 
becomes one‟s sex just as much as one becomes one‟s gender. This does not 
imply a reversal where gender precedes sex; rather it is a disturbance of a 
normative heterosexuality that requires the man/woman dualism, since this 
dualism effectively excludes and renders unintelligible those sexes and sexualities 
that do not comply with the heterosexual matrix.  
 As a response to normative heterosexuality, Butler develops the 
notion of performativity, which implies that one not only becomes one‟s gender; 
one performs it in repetitive acts regarding e.g. corporeal stylization and speech 
(Butler 2006:34; Chambers and Carver 2008:3). Understanding gender as 
performative is a destabilization of the link between sex and gender, something 
that is particularly expressive in drag. But it is not just a matter of one sex 
imitating the opposite gender since that gender is already an imitation in the sense 
that gender is no more than a copy of a copy, a construction imitating a 
supposedly natural male or female sex that turns out to be „sex-less‟ if it is not 
expressed through the created gender (Butler 2006:185-187). In this sense 
femininity does not logically follow from a female sex, since the sex is female 
only in as far as it is performed as the feminine (Butler 2006:9f). Furthermore, 
what the performance of drag brings to the surface is the created link between 
anatomical sex and gender identity. Drag is not necessarily a parody of the 
feminine; rather it is a parody of the assumption of the feminine as natural: “it 
also reveals the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which are 
falsely naturalized as a unity through the regulatory fiction of heterosexual 
coherence. In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of 
gender itself – as well as its coherence” (Butler 2006:187, italics in original). 
 However, performativity is not limited to drag. Through the 
regulatory practices and repetitive acts related to heteronormativity, gender is 
always performed. Corporeal stylization, language, and actions produce and 
reproduce the gendered subject every day, all the time. Gender is something 
“enacted – inscribed in daily practices of speech, both expressed and formed 
through dress, manner and behaviour [sic]” (Chambers and Carver 2008:3, italics 
in original). Included in this notion of gender is that it is not a natural consequence 
of a given sex, rather it implies a notion that perhaps sex itself is performed (ibid). 
The corporeal stylization of gender is presumed to express a specific sex. 
Performing a gender is a strategy of survival, as gender is required if one is to be 
considered an intelligible person: “Discrete genders are part of what „humanizes‟ 
individuals within contemporary culture” (Butler 2006:190, quotation marks in 
original). Hence, it is not an act, a performance in the theatrical sense; rather, 
performativity is the idea that gender is not a noun that exists separately from the 
individual that enacts it: “Because there is neither an „essence‟ that gender 
expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and 
because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, 
and without those acts, there would be no gender at all” (Butler 2006:190, 
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quotation marks in original). It follows that sex does not necessarily need to be 
interpreted as the dualistic male/female. If sex is female only in as far as it is 
realized through the feminine gender, and there is no more feminine gender, then 
there would be no more female sex (Butler 2006:9, 34). Instead, there would be a 
person, and the sex of that person would no more signify its essence than would 
its mouth or nose or any other body part. 
 Performativity is closely related to power: by establishing gender as 
a natural consequence of sex, the construction of both sex and gender is disguised, 
and thus appear to be unrelated to power and discourse. Within the discursive 
regulations of gender the limits of what constitutes a specific gender are 
established: “Knowledge and power are not finally separable but work together to 
establish a set of subtle and explicit criteria for thinking the world” (Butler 
2004:27). The criteria for thinking gender is „a male sex leads to a masculine 
gender (even if this masculinity is socially constructed), and a female sex leads to 
a feminine gender‟. These regulations are what inform the subject about its 
available subjectivities and behaviors, and since it poses as natural it also hides its 
relation to power and discourse.  
 
 
2.2 Heteronormativity 
 
The heterosexual matrix produces gender, both in the form 
of manifestations of masculinity and femininity and in the 
consolidation of the same in the shape of men and women. 
This production is thought to rely upon male and female sex 
as the foundation of gender. The third term of the matrix is 
opposite-sex desire, that which holds the matrix together. 
Heteronormativity is the force that maintains the matrix, 
since it is within this heteronormative core that sex becomes 
gender (or vice versa). (Chambers and Carver 2008:150)  
 
The normative in heteronormativity expresses the regulatory and normalizing 
function of norms; the restrictions set out by a heterosexual matrix that both 
requires and reproduces the masculine/feminine binary. On the other hand, the 
process of conceptualizing a normative heterosexuality can in itself be a 
subversive act, since the function of naturalization requires that the naturalizing 
process remains hidden. The moment that it is exposed as a process, it can no 
longer claim a naturalness since this naturalness is dependent on the norm‟s pre-
cultural and foundational existence; its establishment as a process effectively 
disturbs this claim (Cambers and Carver 2008:142). But what exactly is this 
process of heteronormativity? It is a process whereby the heterosexual subject is 
established as natural. Heteronormativity establishes the heterosexual subject, 
heterosexual sexuality and desires as normal, thus rendering other subject 
positions, other sexualities and desires as deviant, unnatural, and even 
unintelligible (Butler 2004:57, 218; Chambers and Carver 2008:144, 146f).  
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In Gender Trouble (2006), Butler does not actually use the term 
heteronormativity; instead she uses a heterosexual matrix to show the process and 
the effects of a normative heterosexuality (i.e. “heterosexuality when it operates 
as a [regulatory and normalizing] norm” (Chambers and Carver 2008:137)). As 
Chambers and Carver highlight, the norms governing heterosexuality and the 
gendered subject “serves the particular end of producing subjects whose 
gender/sex/desire all cohere in certain ways” (Chambers and Carver 2008:144, 
italics in original). What makes a person intelligible is its presentation as a 
gendered subject; a person who claims no gender is thus not really a person. “One 
important sense of [heteronormative] regulation, then, is that persons are regulated 
by gender, and that this sort of regulation operates as a condition of cultural 
intelligibility for any person” (Butler 2004:52): for a person to be intelligible the 
gender it presents must cohere with its anatomical sex and heterosexual desire. 
Heteronormativity should not be equated with homophobia, rather it is a term 
which expresses heterosexuality as normative and as a “regulatory practice” 
(Chambers and Carver 2008:144). This regulatory practice produces discrete and 
uniform genders through the establishment of a “compulsory heterosexuality” 
(Butler 2006:43). “Heteronormativity emphasizes the extent to which everyone, 
straight or queer, will be judged, measured, probed and evaluated from the 
perspective of the heterosexual norm. It means that everyone and everything is 
judged from the perspective of straight” (Chambers, quoted in Chambers and 
Carver 2008:146f, italics in original). Furthermore, the matrix is not fixed, but is 
constantly produced and reproduced through regulatory practice, repetitive acts, 
and language (Chambers and Carver 2008:148). What Butler (2006) does with the 
heterosexual matrix is to show how heterosexuality is normalized and naturalized 
through an institutionalization of heterosexual norms that appeal to a pre-
discursive law that governs the ontological human:  
 
both gender and sex gain their very coherence through 
heteronormativity. As categories of both thought and 
identity, sex and gender become intelligible within the terms 
of heteronormativity. And this is precisely why lesbian and 
gay identity is consistently rendered unintelligible by 
heteronormativity. A woman who desires a woman is an 
impossibility. (Chambers and Carver 2008:151, italics in 
original)  
 
Hence, heteronormativity establishes the sex/gender division (where the natural 
sex precedes the cultural gender) and opposite-sex desire, effectively prohibiting 
other forms of identities and desires: “for heterosexuality to remain intact as a 
distinct social form, it requires an intelligible conception of homosexuality and 
also requires the prohibition of that conception in rendering it culturally 
unintelligible” (Butler 2006:104, italics in original). Homosexuality must exist 
and be prohibited at the same time in order for heterosexuality to be made the 
culturally viable.  
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 This prohibition of homosexuality serves another purpose than just 
rendering the heterosexual, gendered subject intelligible; it also masks the 
productive capacity of discourse, and the relation between power and discourse. 
As will be discussed further in paragraph 2.3, the juridical notion of power as 
regulation and prohibition serves to mask the multiplicity of power relations 
present in the production of the gendered subject: “this juridical model presumes 
that the relation between power and sexuality is not only ontologically distinct, 
but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a sex which is 
fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other that power itself” (Butler 
2006:129). Furthermore, “juridical power must be reconceived as a construction 
produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of its 
own productivity” (ibid). It follows that normative heterosexuality not only works 
to produce distinct gendered subjects and heterosexual desires, but also to mask 
the productive capacities of power by presenting power as prohibition. 
Destabilizing heteronormativity is, therefore, also to expose these power relations 
in their productive function. 
 
 
2.2.1 Subversion 
 
In relation to heteronormativity, Chambers and Carver (2008) develop a theory of 
subversion. They conceptualize subversion as “a political project of erosion, one 
that works on norms from the inside, breaking them down not through external 
challenge but through an internal repetition that weakens them” (Chambers and 
Carver 2008:142). Subversion is “a critical theoretical and political practice of 
working on norms from within, of undermining those norms. Eroding their 
efficacy, calling them into question either by merely calling them out (i.e. 
revealing their condition as norms) or by challenging their status, their grounding 
or their effects” (Chambers and Carver 2008:142). Hence, subverting 
heteronormativity is more than just exposing and questioning the construction of 
gender; it is a repetitive act whereby the natural foundation of heterosexuality 
(and its presumed fixity in gender binaries) is exposed, disturbed, and weakened. 
And since subjectivity is always a product of discourse, these repetitive acts must 
take place within discourse; they must take place within and through the norms 
that they set out to subvert. The intention is not to subvert identity as such 
(although the destabilization of gender identities will most likely be an effect of 
subverting heteronormativity), but to subvert the repetitive acts that reproduce 
normative heterosexuality (Chambers and Carver 2008:148); rejecting identity or 
deviating from the norm is thus not necessarily subversive acts, since norms 
“depend for their survival on a certain percentage of deviant cases” (Chambers 
and Carver 2008:149). But what then does constitute subversive acts? Merely 
deviating from the norm is clearly not enough, but there is no given agenda for 
what is enough; subversion, put simply, consists of acts that are “challenging, 
calling into question and/or undermining the presumption of heterosexuality” 
(Chambers and Carver 2008:155, italics in original). Hence, “subversions of 
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heteronormativity can and will emerge whenever the presumption of 
heterosexuality is frustrated” (ibid). But what these acts actually consist of is 
always contextually dependent. As Butler states, “[t]he effort to name the criterion 
for subversiveness will always fail, and ought to” (Butler 2006:xxiii); the aim is 
not to replace one set of gender norms with another set (even if this later set might 
be considered more „equal‟ or open); rather it is a matter of questioning what we 
take as foundational of human intelligibility and attempt to break down this 
presumed foundation through repetitive acts that exposes its naturalness as fiction. 
One example of this can be drag, but is can also be a matter of deconstructing 
heteronormativity in language: “[subversion] can emerge in projects that 
deconstruct heterosexuality, that demonstrate its discursive effects and its internal 
contradictions” (Chambers and Carver 2008:155). Hence, subversion can take 
place both practically – through a performance of gender that “exposes the 
internal structure of heteronormativity” (Chambers and Carver 2008:153) and the 
presumed coherence of gender/sex/desire – and theoretical – through a 
deconstruction of theoretical heteronormative presumptions and an exposition of 
discursive productions of the heterosexual matrix.   
 
 
2.3 Power 
 
Norms concerning gender and heterosexuality are closely related to the question 
of power: 
 
The question of who and what is considered real and true is 
apparently a question of knowledge. But it is also, as 
Foucault makes plain, a question of power. Having or 
bearing „truth‟ and „reality‟ is an enormously powerful 
prerogative within the social world, one way in which power 
dissimulates as ontology. (Butler 2004:215, quotation marks 
in original) 
 
When heteronormativity establishes the gendered heterosexual subject as the 
intelligible human certain forms of knowledge are being produced and 
legitimized, knowledges that are related to power and discourse. In The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978), Foucault makes the now famous statement that 
“power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere” (Foucault 1978:93). This does not imply, however, that power 
is disconnected from its effects or practices, nor that it is untouchable, abstract, 
and impossible to deconstruct. Rather, this statement is a rejection of the 
assumption that power only functions through law and that it only has a negative 
effect in form of regulations and prohibitions (Foucault 1978:85f). Power exists in 
every relation, on a multiplicity of levels, and has many shapes and functions 
(Foucault 1978:92f). A juridical power assumes that “domination, submission, 
and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience” (Foucault 
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1978:85), and thus effectively conceals the productive capacities of power. When 
power is recognized only in its visible juridical and institutional disguise, its 
plurality of effects and its presence in discourse and knowledge remains hidden: 
“power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault 
1978:86). Hence, the production of subjects through discourse, the fact that 
subjects are always produced through and in relation to discourse, and thus power, 
is effectively hidden. Power needs to be identified in its “force relations” 
(Foucault 1978:92) which exist in a multiplicity of instances, procedures, 
institutions, and discourses, and it needs to be understood as a process, not as a 
static accumulation of prohibitions and regulations. As a process it is constantly 
moving, changing, and it is also always open for critique, subversion, 
deconstruction, and resistance. 
 The gendered subject is produced within discourse, and the limits to 
what is a knowable gender regulate what is considered to be an intelligible human 
(Butler 2004:41). For example, assumptions of a pre-discursive heterosexuality 
and binary sex/gender formations suggests that these aspects of the subject are 
created outside of discourse, and are therefore natural and universal (Butler 
2006:9f). This would render those subjects that do not conform to this truth 
unintelligible. But what Butler (2006:128f) shows is that there is no subject 
outside of discourse; sex and sexuality are products of a heteronormative 
discourse, but when they present themselves as pre-discursive they effectively 
mask the power/discourse relations that are at play in the creation of the subject. 
Butler states: “a restrictive discourse on gender that insists on the binary of man 
and woman as the exclusive way to understand the gender field performs a 
regulatory operation of power that naturalizes the hegemonic instance and 
forecloses the thinkability of its disruption” (Butler 2004:43, italics in original). 
The normalizing effect of heteronormativity thus legitimizes hierarchical 
relationships and structures, and disguises its own power relations. What 
performativity suggests is (1) that sex, gender and desire are constructed by 
discourse; and (2) that these discourses can be deconstructed and subverted from 
within through a rejection of the gendered actions they presume and a 
reformulation of what sex, gender, and sexuality means (Butler 2004:218).  
 
 
2.4 Feminist Poststructuralism 
 
Chris Weedon (1987) is my main theoretical source on feminist poststructuralism. 
She conceptualizes poststructuralism as a theory and a methodology for 
questioning structuralist assumptions about power/knowledge relations and for 
deconstructing language and its role in the discursive creation of the subject:  
 
For poststructuralist theory the common factor in the 
analysis of social organization, social meanings, power and 
individual consciousness is language. Language is the place 
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where actual and possible forms of social organization and 
their likely social and political consequences are defined and 
contested. Yet it is also the place where our sense of 
ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed. (Weedon 
1987:21, italics in original)    
   
Weedon (1987) rejects the notion that language is a purely descriptive and 
transparent tool for expressing experiences and subjectivity. Instead, she sees 
language as creating the subject and the experiences it sets out to describe 
(Weedon 1987:78). In the production of gendered identities and sexual categories, 
language is thus a central site of power/knowledge relations and of establishing 
ontological and epistemological limits concerning what counts as gender – and in 
effect what counts as human: “It is in language that differences acquire meaning 
for the individual. […] Language differentiates and gives meaning to assertive and 
compliant behaviour [sic] and teaches us what is socially accepted as normal” 
(Weedon 1987:76). Thus, language is one of the central sites where gender is 
performed. It is also one of the central sites for the subversion of established 
gender subjectivities.  
The poststructuralist understanding of language is born out of a 
critique of structuralist ideas about signification and logocentrism. In 
logocentrism, the word is “conceived as existing in itself, as foundation” (Culler 
1983:92). The word is given a metaphysical presence where it is seen as being 
directly linked to truth and reason (Wright 1992:316f). Logocentrism assumes that 
the word is pre-discursive and self-existent, a representation of meaning and a 
signifier of truth, reason and logic (Culler 1983:92). It also rests on the 
assumption that oppositions always consist of a “superior term [which] belongs to 
the logos and is a higher presence” and an inferior term which exists only in 
relation to the superior term, as its negation or disruption (Culler 1983:93). 
Rejecting these assumptions, Jacques Derrida suggests that words are never 
representative but open to a never-ending process of meaning formation (Weedon 
1987:25). There is thus not one single signification of „woman‟ or „feminine‟, but 
a multiplicity of discourses that produces versions of „woman‟ and „feminine‟: 
“feminist poststructuralism insists that forms of subjectivity are produced 
historically and change with shifts in the wide range of discursive fields which 
constitute them” (Weedon 1987:33). Furthermore, the ways in which different 
subjectivities are produced by discourses “have implications for the process of 
reproducing or contesting power relations” (Weedon 1987:92). Different 
discourses have different relations to socio-cultural institutions and, in effect, 
different relations to power (Weedon 1987:97). The subjectivities that are 
available within the boundaries of what is considered natural and normal are 
limited, and subjectivities that do not conform to existing ideas and practices will 
be rendered unintelligible. In order for discourse to establish itself as natural, it 
presents itself as true and hides the power relations at play in its production and 
establishment: “This gives rise to a battle to fix particular versions of femininity 
and masculinity as natural. […] this can be described as a battle for the signified – 
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a struggle to fix meaning temporarily on behalf of particular power relations and 
social interests” (Weedon 1987:98). Language is a particularly important aspect of 
stabilizing natural subjectivities, since language, when it itself is presented as 
foundational, hides the relationship between power, discourse, and knowledge: 
when the word becomes signifier of a particular meaning as truth, the production 
of this „truth‟ in discourse, and in language itself, is effectively masked.  
 A prevailing notion within much feminism is the idea that feminism 
speaks for women; that the experiences of women are in some way coherent and 
can be narrated in a descriptive sense in order to show a universal and common 
oppression of women under patriarchal structures (Butler 2006:2, 5). But this 
notion denies the constructive capacity of language and its relation to discourse 
and power. It also presupposes a unitary identity as „woman‟, thus denying the 
multiplicity of subjectivities and experiences that make up the subject, as well as 
the many sites of oppression, and of resistance. Feminist poststructuralism 
questions this type of feminist reasoning. As a theory, it exposes the connections 
between language, knowledge and power, and the discursive production of the 
subject. It is clear that Butler to a large extent applies a poststructural attitude to 
her reasoning, and both heteronormativity and performativity is easily 
conceptualized within feminist poststructuralism, as is Foucauldian power. The 
common denominator is the rejection of the notion that there are structures and 
laws existing outside of discourse and culture that are somehow fixed and 
universal, and from which specific effects can be deduced. Rather, 
poststructuralism recognizes the production of structures and laws as a part of 
power/discourse relations, and thus exposes their contextuality and specificity. 
What performativity does is reverse the cause–effect relationship, suggesting that 
it is the effects that produce the „cause‟; structures only becomes institutionalized 
through their effects, they do not exist separate from them, just as suggested 
above that sex only becomes naturalized in as far as it is expressed through 
gender.  
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3 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
Ontology  A way of specifying the nature or essence of 
something. Different ontologies offer different beliefs about 
social existence, and different distinctions between 
categories of existence (for example, rocks, primates, 
people). 
Epistemology  A theory of knowledge that specifies how 
researchers can know what they know. Different 
epistemologies (for example, empiricism, realism) offer 
different rules on what constitutes knowledge, and what 
criteria establish knowledge of social or natural reality as 
legitimate, adequate or valid. (Ramazanoglu and Holland 
2002:171, 173, italics in original) 
 
Questions of ontology and epistemology are central to the production of 
knowledge. Locating heteronormative assumptions and performative acts in 
feminist IR theory implies asking questions such as; what constitutes the human?; 
what makes for intelligible subjects?; how is gendered categorization linked to 
power and discourse?; why is a certain type of knowledge conceived as more 
„true‟ that other types of knowledge?; and, put simply (and yet one of the most 
problematic questions of all), why do we know what we know?   
At the core of this thesis is knowledge production. My intention is to 
analyze the (re)production of gendered knowledge within the current feminist 
debate in International Relations, focusing on heteronormativity, performativity, 
and power relations as discussed in the Theory Overview-chapter. Both my 
theoretical and methodological approach is grounded in feminist 
poststructuralism, as developed by Chris Weedon. In this chapter I will discuss 
Internal Discourse Analysis as a method for deconstructing a specific academic 
debate, and how this can be combined with Foucauldian discourse analysis and 
feminist poststructuralism.  
 
 
3.1 Internal Discourse Analysis 
 
As discussed in the Theory Overview-chapter, feminist poststructuralism exposes 
and questions the presumption that structures and laws are universal and pre-
discursive by pointing to the discursive construction of the subject and the 
reversed relationship between cause and effect. Theoretically, this is a rejection of 
structural determinism, heteronormativity, and naturalized binaries such as 
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sex/gender, nature/culture, and masculine/feminine. Methodologically, Weedon‟s 
feminist poststructuralism is concerned with discourses and the interplay between 
discourse, power, and knowledge production. Poststructuralism is most commonly 
associated with deconstruction, and I do not want to dismiss the importance of a 
deconstructive method even within the process of discourse analysis. As I will 
show, exposing and reversing hierarchical oppositions may be a method 
belonging to a theory of deconstruction, but it is an equally important tool in a 
discourse analysis, particularly when the aim of the analysis is to make explicit 
the impact and reproduction of discourses and their relation to dominant modes of 
knowledge production and power relations.  
 In The Political Discourse of Anarchy (1998), Brian C. Schmidt 
proposes a method of internal discourse analysis for analyzing the historical 
development of International Relations as a distinct academic field:  
 
By „internal‟ I mean a focus on the actual conversations 
about the subject matter of international politics pursued by 
previous generations of academic practitioners who self-
consciously identified themselves with the field of 
international relations. This approach is offered as an 
alternative to histories that insist that the development of the 
field of international relations can be understood primarily in 
relation to external events taking place in the realm of 
international politics. (Schmidt 1998:1, quotation marks in 
original) 
 
What Schmidt sets out to do is to “reconstruct an actual conversation” (ibid) 
within International Relations to show the discursive history of the field. 
Traditionally, International Relations‟ history has been written in terms of 
external events affecting the development of the academic field. It has been 
assumed that great political events such as the two World Wars or the end of the 
Cold War – events that have taken place in the so called „real world‟ – have 
shaped the debate and theories within the academic world. According to Schmidt, 
however, the discursive development of International Relations have primarily 
been shaped by the theoretical debates taking place within the academic field, 
something that is shown in the diverse responses that external events have 
received by a plurality of scholars with different theoretical approaches and 
explanations (Schmidt 1998:37). Furthermore, external events cannot explain 
“conceptual changes” (Schmidt 1998:38) within an academic debate: “Although 
the exogenous events of international politics at any given point in time may 
provide a relevant context for understanding the scholarly conversations, 
references to this context cannot explain the particular theoretical and 
methodological dimension of the conversation” (ibid). 
 Schmidt‟s internal discourse analysis is a convincing method for 
analyzing the feminist debate in International Relations since it directs the 
analysis to the most relevant academic material, suggesting that this material in 
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itself can explain theoretical debates and developments within its field (Schmidt 
1998:38). However, in one important respect I will depart from Schmidt‟s method 
of discourse analysis, and this is due to the different focuses of our analyses; 
whereas Schmidt sets out to reconstruct (Schmidt 1998:38) a historical 
conversation, I am deconstructing a present debate. My intention is not to show 
the historical development of discourse within a given academic field, but to 
analyze the impact and reproduction of discourses within an ongoing debate. 
Hence, I need not put the pieces together; I need to pick them apart. Schmidt 
(1998:9) himself recognizes the importance of deconstructing dichotomies and 
binary oppositions in order to critically investigate the epistemological and 
methodological limits to a perceived coherent academic field. 
  
 
3.1.1 Deconstruction 
 
Deconstruction is a method for exposing and reversing hierarchical oppositions in 
a text (Culler 1983:85). In line with Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002), I will 
“take deconstruction […] as reflecting on, questioning, and unsettling existing 
assumptions, meanings and methods. Deconstruction in this sense exposes binary 
thinking and questions how ways of thinking, telling truths, reading texts, and so 
on, have been socially constituted in particular contexts” (Ramazanoglu and 
Holland 2002:88). As a part of a discourse analysis, a deconstruction of the 
feminist IR debate will expose how binary oppositions and heteronormativity is 
reproduced and normalized within and through certain discourses. For this 
purpose, the concept différance, as developed by Jacques Derrida is particularly 
relevant. Derrida‟s différance is a combination of difference and deferral, meaning 
that oppositions are never fixed but always related: “differance [sic] is not an 
opposition, not even a dialectical opposition; it is a reaffirmation of the same, an 
economy of the same in its relation to the other, which does not require that the 
same, in order to exist, be frozen or fixed in a distinction or in a system of dual 
oppositions” (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004:21). Différance is a process of 
“differentiation beyond every kind of limit” (ibid) – a differentiation of the same – 
and hence a disruption of fixed oppositions and the separation between signifier 
and signified; it is that which separates but also that which binds, since meaning is 
dependent on this differentiation. Differences are thus not fixed oppositions such 
as inside/outside, since „inside‟ would not have any signification without 
„outside‟. It follows that what „inside‟ signifies depends on what „outside‟ 
signifies and vice versa; a word‟s meaning is always deferred – it can never be 
understood or expressed on its own – since its definition is always dependent on 
other words, from which it differs. Meaning can thus never be fixed, as is 
assumed by structuralism‟s emphasis on universal law and the separation between 
signifier and signified: “the difference between signifier and signified cannot be 
one of substance and […] what we may at one point identify as a signified is also 
a signifier. There are no final meanings that arrest the movement of signification” 
(Culler 1983:188). The notion of différance blurs the distinction between signifier 
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and signified that is taken for granted in logocentrism, and exposes the 
„meaningless‟ and non-fixity of philosophical oppositions. 
 
 
3.2 Poststructuralism in IR 
 
In my theoretical outline in Chapter 2, I propose an understanding of gendered 
subjects as products of discourse and language, in line with feminist 
poststructuralism. But the theories of Weedon, Butler, and Foucault that I there 
rely on predominantly stem from a philosophical context and might seem foreign 
to the study of international politics – however, poststructuralism should not be 
discarded in International Relations. In Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis 
and the Bosnian War (2006), Lene Hansen discusses the place of poststructural 
analysis in IR, focusing on the discursive production of identity in relation to 
foreign policy:  
 
To say that identity is discursive and political is to argue that 
representations of identity place foreign policy issues within 
a particular interpretive optic, one with consequences for 
which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate 
response. To theorize identity as constructed through 
discourse, and for policy to be dependent thereon, is to argue 
that there are no objective identities located in some extra-
discursive realm, hence identity cannot be used as a variable 
against which behavior and non-discursive factors can be 
measured. (Hansen 2006:6, italics in original) 
 
Bringing this notion of discursive identity production into IR is important because 
it challenges common assumptions about objectivity and representation. It 
exposes the knowledge produced in IR as constructive of the „reality‟ that it 
claims to describe and scientifically measure. As Hansen makes clear, no 
academic analysis is freed from discourse, and knowledge is always 
simultaneously a product of discourse and producer of discursive ontology: 
“Identities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but 
they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are 
simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product” (Hansen 2006:21). When 
one recognizes this discursive production of identity and its relation to e.g. foreign 
policies, then the debate between neo-feminism and IR-feminism becomes of 
great importance not just for gender studies and feminism, but for International 
Relations as a distinct academic field: assuming that gender can be used as an 
explanatory variable denies the discursive production of the gendered subject, and 
reinforces an understanding of IR as representative of an independently existing 
reality. Hence, exposing the production of gendered subjectivities can destabilize 
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these assumptions, and allow for a reformulation of the ontological and 
epistemological grounds on which IR makes its truth claims.  
 Hansen‟s outline of the discursive production of identity in foreign 
policy might be read as an implicit contribution to the feminist debate in IR that I 
here set out to analyze: similar questions of representation, objectivity, and 
neutrality are discussed by Hansen. In this thesis, however, I use Hansen‟s text as 
a methodological device, not as an object of analysis; her outline of 
poststructuralism and discursive identity production in IR, and international 
politics more general, effectively anchors my theoretical and methodological base 
with the academic field of International Relations, showing that questions 
concerning discourse, subjectivity, gender, and knowledge production cannot be 
discarded with reference to IR being a neutral field that studies an objective 
reality. Hence, the internal discourse analysis outlined by Schmidt, in combination 
with Hansen‟s poststructuralism, make up a compelling framework for; firstly, 
selecting material; and secondly, for analyzing this material as produced by – and 
reproducing – discourses on gender and heteronormativity. 
 
 
3.2.1 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
 
The internal discourse analysis as developed by Schmidt is more concerned with 
the discursive history of the field of International Relations than with questions of 
power and knowledge production, and how these are related to discourse. 
Although he states that his intention is to “recover, and differentiate, the actual 
discursive realm of disciplinary history from the variety of rhetorical and 
legitimating histories that currently populate the field” (Schmidt 1998:11), he fails 
to account for the fact that these histories are also constituted by discourse, and 
thus produced by those power relations that establish what counts as legitimate 
knowledge – and legitimate history. Furthermore, as Hansen (2006) shows, 
discourse is not finally separable from any „external reality‟ since discourse is part 
of the creation of that reality. What counts as „real‟ is a product of the knowledge 
and truths that are legitimized by dominant discourses. Poststructural discourse 
analysis is most commonly associated with the writings of Michel Foucault; 
Weedon (1987:chapter 5) proposes a Foucauldian discourse analysis for exposing 
the relation between the text and its social and historical context, as well as the 
power relations and discourses that have been at play in the production of the text 
and the interests that it serves:  
 
It is in the work of Michel Foucault that the poststructuralist 
principles of the plurality and constant deferral of meaning 
and the precarious, discursive structures of subjectivity have 
been integrated into a theory of language and social power 
which pays detailed attention to the institutional effects of 
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discourse and its role in the constitution and government of 
individual subjects. (Weedon 1987:107)  
 
Within any discursive field, there is a plurality of competing discourses. Some of 
these discourses are dominant, whereas others resist and challenge these dominant 
discourses and the knowledge that is produced (Weedon 1987:35). According to 
Foucault (1984:109), discourse is both established through a process of control 
and prohibition, and, simultaneously, always out of reach from the controlling 
mechanisms:  
 
discourse is not simply that which manifests (or hides) desire 
– it is also the object of desire; and since, as history 
constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply that which 
translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the 
thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is 
the power which is to be seized. (Foucault 1984:110) 
 
If the academic field of International Relations is taken as a discursive field in line 
with Schmidt‟s notion of internal discourse analysis, then there will be, within this 
field, both dominant and resisting discourses. Neo-feminism and IR-feminism are 
informed by different discourses which have different relations to power, 
institutions, and dominant modes of knowledge production. Knowledge within the 
debate is produced by and in accordance with these discourses: “In order to 
develop strategies to contest hegemonic assumptions and the social practices 
which they guarantee, we need to understand the intricate network of discourses, 
the sites where they are articulated and the institutionally legitimized forms of 
knowledge to which they look for their justification” (Weedon 1987:126). 
Discourse analysis is a way to reveal the power relations that are at play in the 
production of knowledge, and to locate the subversive possibilities within an 
academic field in order to challenge the dominant discourses.  
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4 The Feminist Debate in IR 
 
 
 
 
 
In the following chapters I will do an internal discourse analysis of the debate 
between neo-feminists and IR-feminists that is currently taking place „within‟ 
International Relations in Great Britain. The purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate why this debate has come about; what forms of knowledge that are 
produced; and why particular forms of gendered knowledge is (re)produced. I will 
focus on how gender is performed and how heteronormativity is reproduced in 
this debate; what kind of truth claims that are made in the texts; and what 
connection these claims have to power and the center of International Relations. 
Hence, I will deconstruct the main arguments in the debate and analyze these with 
reference to theories by Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, and Chris Weedon, as 
discussed in previous chapters. By treating this debate as a discursive field and 
doing an internal discourse analysis of this field, I can expose how neo-feminism 
and IR-feminism relate to discourses on gender; I can analyze the places where 
the texts interact and oppose each other, which limits they set to what is knowable 
and how they relate to each other and to power and the larger field of International 
Relations.  
 The texts I have chosen to analyze does not make up the complete 
debate, but can be considered representative of the most important arguments. My 
notion of what constitutes the most important arguments in this debate is of course 
arbitrary, and another type of analysis might emphasize completely different 
aspects. However, my analysis is guided by an overarching alignment with 
feminist poststructuralism, and more specifically by the theoretical concepts 
performativity and heteronormativity. Hence, what I consider to be the most 
important arguments in these texts are (1) statements that are either immediately 
performing gender (i.e. producing a certain gendered subjectivity) or theoretically  
discussing gender; and (2) statements that are either (re)producing 
heteronormativity, making truth claims that are based on or productive of a 
heterosexual matrix, or theoretically discussing heteronormativity. The outline of 
the articles below should not be understood as a clear cut division between a neo-
feminist and IR-feminist body of research. Considering this debate as a discursive 
field in the way that I do here implies an understanding of the included texts as 
relational and interdependent; they cannot and should not be separated into 
oppositional positions. However, neo-feminism and IR-feminism can be divided 
along a line of rejecting or committing to a feminist agenda, and it is along this 
line that I have divided the texts. This is not to suggest that gender and 
heteronormativity is understood completely differently in the two bodies of texts, 
rather this is a practical division to help make explicit certain assumptions about 
feminism, power, and mainstream IR. Since the main focus of the debate is how 
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feminism should relate to mainstream IR and whether „gender‟ belongs to a 
feminist methodology or can be added as an explanatory variable to any 
methodology, separating the texts in this manner is a way to situate them in 
relation to feminism and mainstream IR – and to each other – based on the 
rejection of, or commitment to, feminism made by the authors themselves.     
 
The texts that will be analyzed are as follows: 
 
Neo-feminism IR-feminism 
Adam Jones, Does „Gender‟ Make the 
World Go Round? Feminist Critiques 
of International Relations (1996)    
Johanna Kantola, The Gendered 
Reproduction of the State in 
International Relations (2007) 
Dibyesh Anand, Anxious Sexualities: 
Masculinity, Nationalism and Violence 
(2007) 
Laura Shepherd, "Victims, Perpetrators 
and Actors" Revisited: Exploring the 
Potential for a Feminist 
Reconceptualisation of (International) 
Security and (Gender) Violence (2007) 
Mary Caprioli, Feminist IR Theory and 
Quantitative Methodology: A Critical 
Analysis (2004)  
Marysia Zalewski, Do We Understand 
Each Other Yet? Troubling Feminist 
Encounters With(in) International 
Relations (2007) 
Lara Coleman, The Gendered Violence 
of Development: Imaginative 
Geographies of Exclusion in the 
Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism 
(2007) 
Terrell Carver, Marysia Zalewski, Helen 
Kinsella and R. Charli Carpenter, 
Gender and International Relations 
(Carver et. al. 2003) 
R. Charli Carpenter, Gender Theory in 
World Politics: Contributions of a 
Nonfeminist Standpoint? (2002) 
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5 Neo-Feminism 
 
 
 
 
 
In the introduction to a theme-issue of British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations (2007) on Gender and International Relations, Judith Squires and Jutta 
Weldes describe neo-feminism as a way to study gender in terms of both 
masculinity and femininity: “we argue that it is entirely possible to deploy diverse 
approaches to gender, only some of which are overtly feminist, that as a whole 
nonetheless unsettle the concerns  and presumptions of more established IR 
scholarship” (Squires and Weldes 2007:191). They go on to state that the 
introduction of neo-feminism to International Relations is “clearly beneficial” 
[since it] “brings men and masculinities into view, allowing „the man question‟ 
[…] to be interrogated and the masculine norms of IR theories and practices 
actively to be unsettled” (Squires and Weldes 2007:191, quotation marks in 
original). Neo-feminism is thus gender analysis without a feminist agenda. It is a 
rejection of the focus on woman in feminist theory, claiming that man is a gender 
too and therefore need to be studied to the same extent as woman. Rather than 
advocating alternative epistemologies and methodologies, neo-feminists wants to 
center gender studies by adding a gender variable to mainstream IR theories and 
methodologies.  
 
 
5.1 Performing Gender 
 
It might seem obvious that equating gender with „woman‟ is biased and that it 
disregards „man‟ and excludes masculinity from the analysis.3 However, merely 
adding man/masculinity to the analysis and then adding the gender analysis to 
mainstream IR methodologies, will never disrupt an understanding of gender in 
binary terms, or effectively undermine the gender/sex/desire matrix that produces 
the heterosexual subject. The result will rather be the opposite: a reproduction of 
compulsory heterosexuality. In Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative 
Methodology: A Critical Analysis (2004), Mary Caprioli discusses the 
incorporation of gender analysis into traditional IR research, with an emphasis on 
quantitative methods. In her article, both sex and gender are conceptualized in a 
heteronormative terminology: “We know, for instance, that masculine and 
feminine values are not inherent to each biological sex but are adopted behaviors 
                                                          
3
 However, feminists such as Monique Wittig and Luce Irigaray would claim that masculinity 
indeed is not a gender: “Gender is the linguistic index of the political opposition between the 
sexes. Gender is used here in the singular because indeed there are not two genders. There is only 
one: the feminine, the „masculine‟ not being a gender. For the masculine is not the masculine, but 
the general” (Wittig, quoted in Butler 2006:27, quotation marks in original). 
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[…]. Gender (masculine/feminine) and biological sex (men/women), however, are 
often used interchangeably” (Caprioli 2004:260). In this statement, gender is 
established as constructed, whereas sex is produced as natural and both gender 
and sex is reduced to opposing dualisms in a perceived natural heterosexual order: 
 
The institution of a compulsory and naturalized 
heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary 
relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a 
feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished 
through the practices of heterosexual desire. The act of 
differentiating the two oppositional moments of the binary 
result in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal 
coherence of sex, gender, and desire. (Butler 2006:31) 
 
Seen in the light of Butler‟s statement, the linguistic separation firstly between sex 
and gender, and secondly between binary genders, is a performative act of 
reproducing the heterosexual subject. In other words, the understanding of gender 
as masculine/feminine and biological sex as men/women, completely excludes 
those humans that do not fit into this matrix from the analysis of international 
relations; in effect they are rendered unintelligible by a knowledge that establishes 
the subject in heteronormative terms; they are not allowed any subject positions in 
Caprioli‟s understanding of the sexed/gendered subject.    
Caprioli‟s differentiation between constructed gender values and 
natural sexes is a performative reproduction of the fixed sexed and gendered 
subject, where the natural sex makes up the material subject, and the constructed 
gender expresses this material sex: masculinity and femininity might be reduced 
to cultural values, but they remain unconditionally linked to the man or woman 
whose sex they represent. Hence, the hierarchical oppositions man/woman, 
masculine/feminine, inside/outside (where sex is inside – or foundation – and 
gender is outside – or representation) remain as stable structures of language, 
knowledge, and the „real world‟. 
This „real world‟, or rather, the idea of a foundational „reality‟ goes 
unquestioned in Does „Gender‟ Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of 
International Relations (1996), in which Adam Jones criticizes feminist emphasis 
on woman and femininity and argues for the need of analyses of man and 
masculinity in IR. This text clearly expresses the strong hold that a positivistic 
understanding of language as descriptive has on IR scholars: “essentialist and 
constructivist positions tend to converge – when feminists turn to a critique of the 
actually existing social and global order (Jones 1996:409, italics in original). 
These essentialist and constructivist positions refer to different feminist theories: 
essentialist feminism is most commonly associated with maternal and radical 
feminism, whereas constructivist perspectives, in this article at least, refer to post-
positivist feminism.
4
 The part emphasized by Jones himself – “the actually 
                                                          
4
 It might be worth noting here that as far as Jones is concerned, these are the only two types of 
feminisms that exist, and he most favorably rely on maternal and radical feminism to represent 
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existing social and global order” (ibid) – assumes that there is an independently 
existing reality out there, pre-discursive and unconstructed, ready to be studied, 
measured, and explained by IR scholars. Furthermore, by emphasizing that this 
„actual reality‟ is where essentialism and constructivism meet, the constructed 
gender becomes the essential sex; gender might be admitted as constructed, but 
this construction only holds on a theoretical level because „reality‟ is made up of 
„real‟ men and women (consisting of sexed material bodies). This produces the 
sexed subject as stable and pre-discursive, and normalizes the sex as foundational 
of the gendered subject. Of course, it could be argued that Jones is just unfamiliar 
with feminist theories, but, nonetheless, this summary of feminist understandings 
and commitments is clearly informed by a heteronormative discourse that 
produces a discretely sexed and gendered ontological human – a discourse that is 
then reproduced by that same text. This clearly establishes sex as foundational, 
essential, and in effect reproduces binaries such as sex/gender, natural/cultural, 
and inside/outside. In order for these oppositions to be reversed – rather than 
reproduced – an understanding of both gender and sex as performative is required. 
The discursive production of the sexed body has to be recognized, and the causal 
link between sex and gender has to be exposed as constructed by heteronormative 
power relations that depend on the naturalization of the discrete heterosexual 
subject. In this article, gender is reproduced as a noun, as descriptive of one of 
two sexes: man or woman, instead of being understood in terms of repetitive acts 
that performs the essence that it claims to describe.      
Recognizing that (at least) gender cannot be fixed in a system of 
binary oppositions, The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative 
Geographies of Exclusion in the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism (Coleman 
2007) represents a more Butlerian conceptualization of gender: “Gendered 
identities do not form a simple (masculine/feminine) binary but, as products of 
power-laden social practices, are multiple, contradictory and open-ended” 
(Coleman 2007:205). The article also emphasizes the importance of discourse in 
the production of the gendered subject: “the discourses which make sense of 
capitalism also narrate the places of gendered bodies within the existing order, 
drawing on and (re)producing gendered identities” (Coleman 2007:205). Even 
though Lara Coleman‟s recognition is not in itself subversive of 
heteronormativity, it destabilizes assumptions about fixed and stable genders, and 
it is informed by poststructural notions of discursive production of the subject, 
leading to a rejection of knowledge and language as purely descriptive or 
explanatory.  In a discipline such as IR, where research is often associated with 
objectivity and measurable validity, and tends to be “privileging causal 
epistemological research projects over those which use, and require, other forms 
of knowledge” (Hansen 2006:9; see also Caprioli 2004:260), exposing the 
productive capacity of language and discourse is one way to reverse hierarchical 
oppositions such as rational/irrational, inside/outside, and order/anarchy, and 
disturb assumptions about neutral knowledge production and observable realities. 
                                                                                                                                                               
feminist critiques as a whole, even though essentialism is rejected by most feminist scholars (for 
examples in IR, see e.g. Sylvester 1994; Steans 1998; Weber 2001).   
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On the other hand, Coleman does not disturb the notion of the foundational sex. 
The article discusses neo-liberal development discourses and how these produce 
“„imaginative geographies‟ which define certain spaces, not so much in terms of 
their physical boundaries or objects within them, but in terms of gendered 
representations of these spaces as „civilised‟ [sic] or „savage‟” (Coleman 
2007:207, quotation marks in original). In this light, Coleman analyzes how neo-
liberalist influences on development agendas are based on an inclusion of the 
minority and an exclusion of the majority (Coleman 2007:206). But there is no 
recognition of how this gendered division of space produces the sexed subject; 
rather the sex is completely removed from the analytical usage of gender as 
masculine/feminine descriptions of spacing. Hence, albeit gender is recognized in 
its open-endedness and fluidity, the effects that this hierarchical differentiation 
has on the production of the sexed/gendered subject is completely excluded. The 
civilized/savage division is made based on the inclusion/exclusion of recognized 
subjects, i.e. those lives that belong to the „ontologically human‟. But where does 
the unrecognized – the life that is not recognized in either space; that is not even 
recognized as human – belong? Furthermore, the gendering of these spaces in a 
hierarchical masculine/feminine economy reproduces the subjects inhabiting these 
spaces as gendered, in effect further excluding those subjects that do not conform 
to the heterosexual matrix. Indeed, they are already excluded from Coleman‟s 
analysis, and thus reproduced as unintelligible within her conceptualization of 
gender. Coleman states that her article focuses on “the mutually constitutive 
relationship between gendered identities and neo-liberal capitalism, looking at 
how neo-liberal development and the violence attendant on it is legitimised [sic] 
and made possible through the mobilisation [sic] of hierarchically ordered gender 
identities” (Coleman 2007:205). But there is no recognition of that these 
“hierarchically ordered gender identities” (ibid) also produce the subjects living 
under neo-liberal structures as sexed. Rather, she relies on an understanding of 
gender as “a tool of what might be called ideology critique” which means a 
concern for “how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organize 
the way people interpret events and circumstances” (Young, quoted in Coleman 
2007:205). Hence, gender is a way of understanding one‟s surroundings; gendered 
structures create different masculine/feminine “meanings and images” (ibid) 
through which „reality‟ is discursively understood, and reproduced. In line with 
neo-feminism, this separates gender from sex, and establishes gender as an 
analytical tool for making sense of gendered discourses and structures (which are 
recognized by Coleman (2007:205) as mutually constitutive). But gender norms 
(in Coleman‟s article understood as “meanings and images” (ibid)) can never be 
separated from the body:  
 
In fact, the norm only persists as a norm to the extent that it 
is acted out in social practice and reidealized and reinstituted 
in and through the daily social rituals of bodily life. The 
norm has no independent ontological status, yet it cannot be 
easily reduced to its instantiations; it is itself (re)produced 
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through its embodiment, through the acts that strive to 
approximate it, through the idealizations reproduced in and 
by those acts. (Butler 2004:48)           
 
If gender norms are always tied to the body in the way that Butler here suggests, 
then the separation that Coleman – and neo-feminism in general – attempts, 
reproduces a notion of gender as ontologically independent, a notion that Butler 
here effectively refutes. Hence, using gender as an analytical tool of any kind 
masks the ways in which gender norms produce the (sexed) body – and are 
reproduced on the surface of this body.  
 
          
5.2 Heteronormativity 
 
In Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis 
(Caprioli 2004), a separation between gender and sex is suggested as 
methodologically favorable in the sense that sex then can be used as a measurable 
variable: “Sex, therefore, is a meaningful category in feminist analysis because it 
helps us understand the effects of the prevailing masculine/feminine stereotypes at 
all levels of analysis. In other words, sex becomes an indicator of gender and can 
be empirically measured” (Caprioli 2004:260f, emphasis added). This separation 
between sex and gender – where sex is a measurable variable and gender is a 
socially constructed quality that is appropriated by the sexed human – is 
inevitably reinforcing a notion of a natural sex that precedes the constructed 
gender. Stating that the sex indicates the gender suggests that sex can be read on 
the surface. This can be understood as contrasting the notion that gender is what 
appears on the surface as indicator of a specific sex, but it should rather be read as 
a confusion of the two terms, and an establishment of normative heterosexuality, 
where e.g. a feminine gender always follows from a female sex. What is assumed 
to be on the bodily surface in this case is an anatomical sex that is expressed 
through specific corporeal stylization that reveals this sex to the observer. 
Furthermore, this separation is informed by a heteronormative discourse that 
assumes that there are stable, coherent subjects „out there in the real world‟ that 
can be studies in terms of their natural sex. Gender, is in this sense, becomes 
behavioral characteristics that are „given to‟ sexed subjects to explain social and 
cultural inequality. Hence, oppression of „women‟ is reduced to a hierarchical 
ordering of gender qualities, where the „masculine‟ qualities are valued higher 
than the „feminine‟ ones. Butler states: “When the constructed status of gender is 
theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating 
artifice” (Butler 2006:9). But rather than gender being “radically independent of 
sex” (ibid), Caprioli‟s article suggests an understanding of gender as descriptive 
of sex. In order for sex to be “an indicator of gender” (Caprioli 2004:261), there 
has to be a measurable correlation between the two where sex signifies gender – 
gender is the corporeal stylization of sex; the external expression of the internal. 
This type of analysis presumes a causal relationship between the two. Butler goes 
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on to state that “gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the 
discursive/cultural means by which „sexed nature‟ or „a natural sex‟ is produced 
and established as „prediscursive‟, prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on 
which culture acts” (Butler 2006:10, italics and quotation marks in original). 
Quantitatively measuring sex in order to analyze gender inequalities, as is 
suggested in Caprioli‟s text (2004:260-263), thus reproduces an understanding of 
the subject based on a heterosexual matrix of gender/sex/desire. Rather than 
locating the ways in which sex is performed though gender, this text assumes that 
gender is something that the sexed subject has; gender is the natural consequence 
of a specific sex, and the sexed subject is therefore always already a gendered 
subject in accordance with a masculine/feminine heteronormative binary.     
 In Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist 
Standpoint? (2002) by R. Charli Carpenter, it is gender, rather than sex, that is 
advocated as the analytical instrument. But the article also argues for a separation 
between sex and gender. It suggests that feminist authors “confuse sex and 
gender”, and that this leads to “a great deal of descriptive research on sex-
differentiated behavior, impacts, and issues […] but little explanatory analysis of 
how gender (identities, beliefs, and discourse) constructs these outcomes” 
(Carpenter 2002:160, italics in original). Whereas this statement can be read as a 
recognition of the discursive production of the sexed body, a later statement in the 
article refutes this reading: “Goldstein‟s work is groundbreaking as an example of 
how gender as an explanatory instrument may be combined with a conventional 
IR agenda using empirical science rather than interpretivism” (Carpenter 
2002:161, emphasis added). The conceptualization of gender as an “explanatory 
instrument” (ibid) encourages an understanding of both gender and sex as fixed 
categories, one cultural, and the other natural. If one reads these statements as 
suggesting that gender be used as an instrument to explain differences between the 
sexes, the argument can be put forth that sexual inequality is constructed rather 
than natural, a view that has long been held by a variety of feminisms. We might 
speak here of an internalization of gender norms that affects the sexed subject in 
certain ways, but how this should be empirically studied remains unclear, at least 
outside of a heteronormative framework. For gender to function as an explanatory 
instrument, it has to be fixed in coherent categories. If gender is not 
conceptualized as a masculine/feminine binary, but instead recognized in its 
fluidity and open-endedness – its différance – how does one use it to explain e.g. 
“the social dynamics of warfare” as Carpenter (2002:161) suggests? For an 
explanatory instrument to work, the instrument has to be clearly defined and 
secured so that it can be deployed in various contexts and on various subject 
matters, in accordance with IR standards on hypothesis testing, validity, and 
replicability. Gender has to be categorized, but into what? The effect of 
Carpenter‟s suggestion is that gender be fixed in dualistic heteronormative 
categories which reduce sex to an equally dualistic conceptualization of the 
naturally sexed man or woman: “It is an empirical fact that human beings are 
divided into roughly two categories based on biological roles and reproduction; 
this would still be true whether gender ideologies that assign social importance to 
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this distinction exist or not” (Carpenter 2002:164). Therefore, “the distinction 
between sex and gender remains important for operationalizing the two” 
(Carpenter 2002:161). Hence, according to Carpenter, humans are “divided into 
roughly two categories” (Carpenter 2002:164): men and women, and these 
categories exist independently of the meaning that is given them through gender. 
It is a logocentric understanding of the terms man and woman – and sex – where 
these terms are perceived as signifiers of a biological truth. Butler effectively 
disturbs this logocentric understanding of the pre-discursive sex: 
 
And what is „sex‟ anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, 
chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to 
asses the scientific discourses which purport to establish 
such „facts‟ for us? Does sex have a history? […] Is there a 
history of how the duality of sex was established, a 
genealogy that might expose the binary options as variable 
construction? […] If the immutable character of sex is 
contested, perhaps this construct called „sex‟ is as culturally 
constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already 
gender, with the consequence that the distinction between 
sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (Butler 
2006:9f, quotation marks in original)  
            
Separating sex and gender in the sense that both Carpenter (2002) and Caprioli 
(2004) does, implies that they have not asked the same questions as Butler. To 
further suggest the measurability of either of the two is to reproduce the 
unintelligibility of any subject that does not fit into the measurable data – i.e. any 
subject that does not conform to the heterosexual matrix of sex/gender coherence.  
The purpose of the operational separation between sex and gender is 
to enforce an analysis of how “gender affects world politics” by investigating how 
gender identity, gender ideology, gender structure and gender norms “all 
constitute and reinforce a global (but changing) gender regime” (Carpenter 
2002:165, italics in original). The difference between this analysis and an overtly 
feminist project is the abandonment of feminism‟s normative commitment to 
women. On the surface, this seems like a convincing aspiration, but it requires an 
understanding of “gender per se [as] simply an analytical category” (Carpenter 
2002:165), that can be used to explain sex hierarchies and oppression. This, in 
turn, requires that gender (as category) regulates sex (as subject): “to become 
subject to a regulation is also to become subjectivated by it, that is, to be brought 
into being as a subject precisely through being regulated” (Butler 2004:41). 
Hence, this notion of gender reproduces the intelligible human as a gendered 
human. Existing outside of these gender categories means not existing at all. 
Butler asks: “If „identity‟ is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is 
gender identity, construed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, 
and desire, the effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory 
heterosexuality?” (Butler 2006:24, italics and quotation marks in original). 
 36 
 
Explaining sexual inequality by reference to gender as an analytical instrument in 
effect produces the sexed subject; and understanding gender structures (or 
structures, institutions, economies etc. as gendered) as masculine/feminine 
hierarchies reproduces a heterosexual matrix.   
 In contrast to both Caprioli‟s and Carpenter‟s articles, Jones (1996) 
does not attempt any distinction between sex and gender. Rather, this text 
expresses a clear and undeniable correlation between the two where sex and 
gender is almost understood as same – man equals masculine and woman equals 
feminine – and where both sex and gender possess some foundational stability and 
meaning. For example, 
 
If women equal peace and men war, then we are again 
looking at a project to feminize the political. (Jones 
1996:418, emphasis added) 
 
When constructivist leanings combine with post-positivism, 
the result is a deep suspicion even of the basic labels of sex 
and gender. (Jones 1996:409, emphasis added) 
 
What if scholars of international political economy 
standardly factored in women‟s contributions in the 
domestic/reproductive sphere? (Jones 1996:412, emphasis 
added) 
 
This last quotation is part of a discussion of feminist analyses of the public/private 
dichotomy: “Perhaps the most significant aspect of the feminist critique of the 
state – one that extends far beyond the boundaries of radical feminism – is the 
project to reclaim the private” (Jones 1996:412, italics in original). Jones‟ 
understanding of the domestic sphere is clearly informed by a discourse on 
heterosexuality where the domestic sphere is a sphere belonging to the family and 
women are reduced to the reproductive part of this conjunction. It is especially the 
equation of domestic with reproductive that suggest this reading: by making 
domestic and reproductive the same, the domestic becomes reduced to a 
heterosexual sphere, effectively excluding non-heterosexual unions from the 
domestic, leading to an analysis of the private that can only be conceptualized in 
heteronormative terms. Where does this leave sexual and/or love relations and 
kinships that are not heterosexual? 
 In a similar vein, Dibyesh Anand‟s article Anxious Sexualities: 
Masculinity, Nationalism and Violence (2007), is informed by a heteronormative 
discourse where sex and gender correlate in a heterosexual matrix, and „gender 
qualities‟ (i.e. masculine/feminine) are used uncritically to describe behavior and 
subjects. The article deals with Hindu nationalism in India, and how notions of 
„masculinity‟ affect national identity. Anand‟s article is clearly not feminist in that 
it almost exclusively deals with men and masculinities (assuming somehow that 
only men are informed by discourses on masculinity and nationalism). The 
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conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India that the article deals with thus 
become reduced to a conflict between (heterosexual) men: “Where do these 
representations of Muslim men leave Hindu masculinity? This dangerously virile 
Muslim masculinity is initially contrasted with docile, effeminate Hindu men, 
emasculated by the feminine principles of Hinduism” (Anand 2007:260, emphasis 
added). This article is a neo-feminist expansion of „gender‟ to the realm of men 
and masculinity, but rather than destabilizing fixed gender categories, these 
categories are reinforced as hierarchical oppositions. The statement above, for 
example, clearly suggests a binary relationship between masculinity and 
femininity. Gender is here understood as a weapon in the conflict between Hindus 
and Muslims; masculinity and femininity is used by the parties in the conflict to 
either enforce a national identity or dehumanize the enemy. Hence, gender is 
understood as ontologically distinct from sex: a hierarchical opposition that 
signifies specific meanings but that in no way is productive of the body that these 
meanings are „given to‟. A second implication of Anand‟s article is a reproduction 
of a historical exclusion of women and non-heterosexual subjects. I would suggest 
that the focus on men and masculinities in Anand‟s text is not so much an 
expansion of „gender‟ as a maintenance of a historical narrative by and about 
men; a continuous de-subjectivation of woman. In effect, a hierarchical 
differentiation between men and women is reproduced within existing power 
structures. A conscious effect of feminist analysis is to reverse these hierarchical 
structures and write a history that recognizes women – and other historically 
excluded subjects – as subjects. This is not a matter of reinforcing a sexual 
differentiation, but to claim a voice from within prevailing discourses; a 
subversion of the norms that naturalize „man‟ as universal.  
 
 
5.3 Neo-Feminism or Post-Feminism? 
 
The above discussed articles all suggest an understanding of sex and gender in 
heteronormative terms. They are informed by a heteronormative discourse and 
reproduce this very discourse through language. The emphasis on „expanding‟ 
gender to include men and masculinities does not in any way disrupt gender 
binaries, sexual categorization or a conceptualization of the subject as 
heterosexual. To suggest that these critiques are not relevant in International 
Relations because of the focus on „high politics‟ such as warfare, diplomacy, 
international law etc. is to mask the productive capacity of language and 
discourse, and the power structures that legitimize certain types of truth claims 
while discrediting others. Speaking of the unintelligible, as I do in this analysis, is 
to speak of the subjects that are not only excluded from these articles, but that are 
rendered non-existent by ways of this exclusion: “„recognition‟ names a reflective 
process in which one comes to be only through being recognised [sic]. This means 
that neither subjectivity nor human existence can be taken for granted in advance; 
the process of recognition (not contained or controlled by any single subject) 
makes human being possible” (Chambers and Carver 2008:125f, italics and 
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quotation marks in original). By understanding, studying, and creating 
international politics as heteronormative, those lives that are unrecognized remain 
„other than human‟; non-existent; non-livable: “the power of intelligibility, i.e. the 
normalisation [sic] of visible subjects, operates with a stealthy silence. That is, 
normalisation [sic] does not just categorise [sic] human subjects; it produces the 
conditions of possibility for the „human‟ in the first place” (Chambers and Carver 
2008:126f, quotation marks in original). The articles analyzed above all suggest 
that the knowledge produced in IR can and should be „gender-neutral‟, i.e. that 
gender analysis should be as much about men and masculinities as it is about 
women and femininities in feminist research. However, this suggestion, when it is 
presented in a heteronormative language, does far more than merely reject 
feminist knowledge production: it normalizes the coherent sexed/gendered 
subject, and in effect not only excludes, but renders unintelligible those lives that 
do not fit into this „gender-neutral‟ analysis. Recognizing the discursive 
production of the subject through e.g. language is to recognize that the knowledge 
produced in IR is as constructive of human subjectivities as in any other academic 
field. Exposing the ways in which IR reproduces heteronormativity is thus not just 
a matter of theoretical critique; it should be understood as an attempt to 
destabilize the truth claims that produce certain humans as intelligible and others 
as unintelligible – for whom these truth claims have very immediate effects.     
 With this in mind I would suggest that the term neo-feminism is 
misguiding for the project that these authors aspire for. „Mainstreaming‟ gender in 
the ways suggested by neo-feminism is considered an effective means of bringing 
„gender‟ into the analysis of international politics without disrupting the center of 
IR, or the epistemologies and methodologies that are established as legitimate and 
valid at this center. The idea is that this will lead to a gender-neutral analysis that 
is as concerned with femininity as it is with masculinity. This might be considered 
a „neo‟ to liberal feminism5, but it is miles away from the poststructural and 
postmodern feminisms that are informed by Butlerian and Foucauldian 
understandings of discourse, power, language, and subjectivities. Furthermore, 
merely adding gender to mainstream IR methodologies only reinforces a 
heteronormative discourse that will continue to produce the intelligible human at 
the expense of the unintelligible: “Inclusion cannot solve the problem of 
unintelligibility, since (again, by definition) the unintelligible cannot be included 
given that they do not even exist as human” (Chambers and Carver 2008:128, 
italics in original). Hence, the effect of including gender as masculine and 
feminine reproduces an understanding of the human as gendered: “If there is no 
                                                          
5
 I here understand ‟neo‟ in the sense that it is commonly understood in IR, e.g. in terms such as 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism, where the „neo‟ refers to a development of the original theory, but 
where the new theory still remains faithful to the main conceptualizations in the theory from which 
it has developed. In this sense, neo-feminism is read as a theoretical development of „traditional‟ 
IR-feminism.  
Liberal feminism is a feminism that sprung out of the liberal tradition of the 
Enlightenment: “Liberal feminism is centrally concerned with equal rights. Liberals hold a view of 
human nature which stresses the capacity of human beings for rational thought” (Steans 1998:16).  
Hence, it is a feminism that is concerned with the inclusion of women.  
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subject position in which to appear, then one cannot inhabit the human” (ibid). 
Feminisms belonging to the poststructural and postmodern are to a large extent 
informed by this, and attempts analyses that disturb, rather than reinforce, 
heteronormativity in order to expand what is considered human. In this respect, 
the articles discussed above are more „post‟ than „neo‟ to feminism, since there is 
not much left of any feminist agenda except for the concept „gender‟, which is 
also often conceptualized differently than in poststructural and postmodern 
feminisms.
6
 Reconceptualizing neo-feminism as post-feminism is, hence, a way to 
understand this theoretical approach as one that is critical towards feminist 
projects, rather than as one that is developing feminist arguments.  
If the power relations that through discourse produces the subject 
produces it as gendered, then to „de-gender‟ the subject would be to make rid of 
the subject position completely. As long as mainstream IR epistemology is 
informed by a heteronormative discourse that requires a stable sex/gender matrix, 
any comprehension of a knowledge that disrupts this order will be marginalized, if 
not completely excluded. Furthermore, the heteronormative naturalization of the 
gendered subject and the sexed body effectively hides the power relations that 
need to be disrupted if heteronormativity is ever to be subverted: 
heteronormativity simultaneously normalizes gendered knowledge and presents 
this knowledge as regulatory rather than productive. Neo-feminism, in its 
attempts to centralize gender, is a part of the process that masks the 
power/discourse relations that produce and naturalize heteronormative subject 
positions. I would propose that this is due to an internalization of a knowledge 
that stipulates what constitutes valid research and legitimate truth claims. Hence, 
the issue of labeling this approach as neo- or post-feminism is of significance 
because neo-feminism suggests a critical commitment that I argue has been 
abandoned. The claim that gender can be mainstreamed into conventional IR 
theories and methodologies reproduces an inside/outside dichotomy that works to 
legitimize certain types of truth claims and knowledges while effectively 
excluding others. In effect, IR remains a coherent field of research where 
epistemologies and methodologies are hierarchically ordered according to their 
presumed ability to present „accurate‟ results, and feminist knowledge production 
remains discredited as „biased‟ towards women rather than being recognized as a 
legitimate approach to international relations.
7
    
   
 
                                                          
6
 ’Post‟ is here understood as a term that describes a critical reconceptualization of the theory that 
it is ‟post‟ to; post-positivist approaches, for example, “share a common objective of breaking 
down the positivist „orthodoxy‟” (Steans 1998:36, quotation marks in original). Similarly, 
postmodernism “can be seen as growing out of a critique of the Enlightenment project” (Steans 
1998:25), and ideas about the modern, the rational, the universal etc.    
7
 For the sake of coherence and comprehensibility, I will continue to refer to this approach as neo-
feminism throughout this thesis. This is to avoid any insecurity about which body of texts in the 
debate I refer to. However, I maintain that the term post-feminism is more expressive of the type 
of knowledge that this approach offers. 
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6 IR-Feminism 
 
 
 
 
 
In Gendering World Politics (2001), Tickner states that the “key concern for 
feminist theory is to explain women‟s subordination, or the unjustified asymmetry 
between women‟s and men‟s social and economic positions, and to seek 
prescriptions for ending it” (Tickner 2001:11). According to Cynthia Weber, 
“[f]eminists have politically chosen to take a self-consciously „biased‟ view of the 
world to compensate and hopefully transform traditional ways of seeing the world 
that occlude women and femininities as well as non-normative men and 
masculinities” (Weber 2001:98, quotation marks in original). These quotes are 
from two prominent feminist authors in International Relations, authors who 
argue for the need of a feminist theoretical approach to international politics. 
Zalewski understands the current debate about feminism (and gender) in IR as one 
where neo-feminism is “representing an attempt to recuperate [Gender and 
International Relations] into the discipline, while leaving the mainstream 
unaltered, and counterposes this to a more transformatory feminist engagement 
that seeks to unsettle the discipline” (Squires and Weldes 2007:190). Hence, what 
differentiates IR-feminism from neo-feminism is a normative commitment to a 
feminist agenda, and a desire to challenge mainstream IR epistemologies and 
methodologies. 
 
 
6.1 Performing Gender 
 
In The Gendered Reproduction of the State in International Relations (2007), 
Johanna Kantola offers an “approach [that] challenges the unity of the state, 
power and gender, and [where] the state becomes the gendered effect of 
discursive and structural processes” (Kantola 2007:270). This implies an 
understanding of the gendered state (i.e. the state as masculine) as an effect of 
gender discourse, as opposed to an understanding of the state as producer of 
gender hierarchies. This not only reverses the cause/effect relationship, but also – 
and more importantly – questions assumptions about the state as central and 
foundational in International Relations. If the state is a product of discourse, then 
it is discursive processes – and not the state – that shapes international politics, 
and that simultaneously creates the state as gendered. According to Kantola, 
simply recognizing that the state reproduces “a certain gender system and gender 
power orders” where “states construct gender [and] gender constitutes the state” 
(Kantola 2007:271) is not enough. Rather, what is needed is an implementation of 
Foucauldian power to the feminist analysis of the state: “Instead of being 
repressive, power in this view is productive in that power relations constitute 
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subjects” (Kantola 2007:278). This expands the analysis to deal with power and 
the production of both states and gender, as opposed to an analysis of the state as 
a site for the hierarchical ordering of gender and sex, i.e. where the men hold the 
power and the women are oppressed and excluded; and where masculinity is 
valued higher that femininity. Hence, Kantola proposes that “particular discourses 
construct state boundaries, identities and agency and the state is a discursive effect 
of these processes” (Kantola 2007:278, italics in original). Understanding the state 
in this sense opens up for the possibility of subversive performances that may 
disrupt the boundaries of the state; foundational national and gendered identities; 
and state-centric international politics. It is a destabilization of the sovereign state 
that suggests that the state can be performed otherwise. In effect, gender and 
sexuality can be performed otherwise since the state no longer has to be 
conceptualized in heteronormative terms; the state is no longer fixed as masculine 
in a hierarchical opposition to the feminine anarchy.
8
 The state is only „masculine‟ 
in as far as it is performed as masculine, a performance that is disguised by a 
discourse that establishes the state as natural and foundational – as the necessary 
social alternative to „a state of nature‟.        
 This understanding of states as produced through discursive 
performances is further developed in „Victims, Perpetrators and Actors‟ 
Revisited: Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of 
(International) Security and (Gender) Violence (Shepherd 2007). Here, Laura 
Shepherd explicitly argues that the state is indeed performed – a performance that 
is restricted by prevailing discourses on violence and security: “within this 
conceptualisation [sic] it is possible to say that states, acting as unitary 
authoritative entities, perform violences, but also that violences, in the name of 
security, perform states” (Shepherd 2007:249). In effect, violence becomes 
“constitutive of subjectivity” rather than something that is done to already 
sovereign individuals (Shepherd 2007:240, 244) and security can be rethought “as 
a set of discourses rather than as something that can be achieved either in absolute 
or relative terms” (Shepherd 2007:249). As long as the state is conceptualized in 
absolute terms – as an end in itself – the discursive reproduction of the state will 
remain hidden, as will the violent reproduction of heteronormativity; in effect, the 
state-centric approaches of e.g. (neo)realism can be revealed as part of this violent 
reproduction. This is a form of normative violence understood not as “a type of 
violence that is somehow „normative‟, but [as] the violence of norms” (Chambers 
and Carver 2008:76, quotation marks in original, emphasis added); it is a 
“violence done within the formation of subjectivity” (Chambers and Carver 
2008:78, italics in original). What this means is that gender norms establish the 
conditions whereby the ontological human is recognized – these norms are both 
violently imposed on the subject (since the individual has to comply with these 
                                                          
8
 The conceptualization of the state as masculine versus the anarchic international space as 
feminine is a gendered understanding of international politics imbedded in „orthodox‟ IR theory, a 
conceptualization that has been criticized and deconstructed by feminist IR-scholars (see e.g. 
Steans 1998).  
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norms in order to be recognized as a subject) and violently excluding those 
subjectivities that does not conform:  
 
Gender norms produce viable and unviable genders prior to 
any choice we might make about „doing‟ our gender. The 
agency of gender is both enabled and constrained by gender 
norms. And it should be stressed that the „choice‟ to do 
gender right or wrong may not be available to some. It 
becomes easy to do normative violence to gender deviants, 
precisely because they are dehumanised [sic] through their 
non-normative gender or sexuality. (Chambers and Carver 
2008:89, quotation marks in original) 
 
Another way of understanding this normative violence is as discursive violence, 
where “discourse [is understood] as a violence which we do to things, or in any 
case as a practice which we impose on them” (Foucault 1984:127). The discursive 
reproduction of heteronormativity is thus a violence done to those subjects that are 
rendered unintelligible by the heterosexual matrix, and this violence is imbedded 
in the language of IR.  
By making visible the logocentrism inherent in IR, the violent 
reproduction of both the state and the subject can be disrupted. In Gender and 
International Relations (Carver et. al. 2003), Helen Kinsella exposes the 
logocentric understanding of the word as signifier: “a gender constructivism that 
claims to broaden the focus from „women‟ to „political outcomes in general‟ […] 
reproduces a presumption of women as „particular‟ and „marginal‟ that is set 
against the study of some putative neutral „universal‟ or „generality‟” (Kinsella, in 
Carver et. al. 2003:295, italics and quotation marks and in original). Revealing the 
production of hierarchies such as universal/particular and generality/marginal 
reverses these oppositions by destabilizing their presumed natural foundation. 
Reversing hierarchical oppositions is a means to make visible the productive 
capacity of power and the ways in which language performs, rather than 
represents, e.g. gender and sex: “Power thus operates at this conjunction between 
human activity and meaning, and it „produces‟ in language what the language 
„claims merely to represent‟ (Chambers and Carver 2008:36, quotation marks in 
original). R. Charli Carpenter‟s understanding of gender as representative 
naturalizes both gender and sex as binary categories that signifies what humans 
are (Carpenter 2002). Kinsella‟s reversal of theses binaries, however, can be read 
as an initiative to understand gender and sex as something that humans do; as 
performative (Chambers and Carver 2008:39). Performing gender in ways that 
normalizes heterosexuality, naturalizes sex, and in this process denies its own 
performance, is (re)productive of an economy that needs to be disrupted in order 
to expand what is recognized as ontologically human. Butler states:  
 
If I am someone who cannot be without doing, then the 
conditions of my doing are, in part, the conditions of my 
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existence. If my doing is dependent on what is done to me 
or, rather, the ways in which I am done by norms, then the 
possibility of my persistence as an „I‟ depends upon my 
being able to do something with what is done with me. 
(Bulter 2004:3, italics and quotation marks in original) 
 
Committing to feminist epistemologies and methodologies is one way to 
performatively disturb the norms that regulate what is „doable‟ and what is 
recognized as intelligible subject positions.  
   
        
6.2 Heteronormativity 
 
In a forum discussion entitled Gender and International Relations (Carver et. al. 
2003) Terrell Carver, Marysia Zalewski, Helen Kinsella, and R. Charli Carpenter, 
discusses feminism in IR in response to Carpenter‟s article Gender Theory in 
World Politics: Contributions of a Non-Feminist Standpoint? (2002). Zalewski 
(Carver et. al. 2003) here makes explicit the continuing hierarchical division 
between the “„purely explanatory work‟ in IR” and the “„merely normative‟ work 
of feminism” in the IR discipline (Zalewski, in Carver et. al. 2003:292, italics and 
quotation marks in original). This clearly expresses the strong hold that classical 
Enlightenment ideals have on IR scholars; hierarchical oppositions such as 
rational/irrational, objectivity/subjectivity, and order/anarchy are reproduced as 
representative of a good social science. The effect of this reproduction is a 
reinforcement of logocentrism, where all knowledge claims are measured against 
assumptions about neutrality and „the rational man‟, and where the word is given 
a signifying, rather than a productive, status. Carpenter‟s response in this Forum is 
expressively informed by a logocentric discourse: “beyond being useful as 
critique or in theorizing everyday practice, gender is also an important 
explanatory tool in the merely „problem-solving‟ project of understanding and 
explaining the world as it is” (Carpenter, in Carver et. al. 2003:297, quotation 
marks in original, emphasis added). Gender, when deployed as an “explanatory 
tool” that can explain the “world as it is” (ibid) in this sense, is understood as 
representative of a meaning that is pre-discursive. Locked in this logocentric 
opposition, gender will never be more than a masculine/feminine order that 
describes the world and the subjects that inhabit this world.  
Marysia Zalewski‟s article Do We Understand Each Other Yet? 
Troubling Feminist Encounters With(in) International Relations (2007) is a direct 
input in the debate between neo-feminism and IR-feminism regarding the 
adoption of the „gender variable‟ by mainstream IR theories and methodologies. 
First and foremost this article is a critique of attempts to compartmentalize 
feminism as “inevitably aspirational and normative” (Halley, quoted in Zalewski 
2007:304) and of the neo-feminist project to separate the „gender variable‟ from a 
feminist agenda. Zalewski recognizes that power is an integral part of the 
marginalization of feminist knowledge in IR since it “pervades the very 
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conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms” (Zalewski 2007:307). 
Hence, power is by Zalewski recognized in it multiplicity, and as productive of 
the discourses it purports to constrain. Feminism, in its attempts to contest and 
reverse the power hierarchies of International Relations, is not outside of that 
power; rather it is a consequence of power/discourse relations which require the 
„outside‟ – the „Other‟ – in order to present the „inside‟ as natural, coherent, and 
stable. In relation to sexuality, Butler writes:  
 
If sexuality is culturally constructed within existing power 
relations, then the postulation of a normative sexuality that is 
„before‟, „outside‟, or „beyond‟ power is a cultural 
impossibility and a politically impracticable dream, one that 
postpones the concrete and contemporary task of rethinking 
subversive possibilities for sexuality and identity within the 
term of power itself. (Butler 2006:42, quotation marks in 
original)   
 
Subversion, by necessity, always takes place within the norms that it sets out to 
subvert; it is the repetitive acts of destabilizing these norms that in the end will 
overthrow them. Conforming to these norms, however, is to continue to mask the 
power that produces them: neo-feminism‟s attempts on „gender-neutrality‟ by 
adding the „gender variable‟ to non-feminist epistemologies and methodologies is, 
in effect, a reproduction of heteronormativity and a reinforcement of power as 
juridical – or regulatory: “Power simply does not really act as a „differential‟ […], 
or as something one can grasp hold of, if only we tried hard enough and 
constructively enough, or if only those in power would behave more responsibly 
or more benignly” (Zalewski 2007:307). Heteronormativity has to be understood 
as productive of the sexed and gendered subject in order for the power relations 
that remain hidden behind its presumed naturalness to be exposed. Power is not 
that which merely regulates the heterosexual subject; it is that which produces the 
thinkability of sexuality in the first place. The separation of sex and gender that is 
suggested by neo-feminism denies power as productive by reference to a 
logocentrism where gender/sex is ordered in accordance with a culture/nature 
dichotomy. Kinsella (2003) makes visible – and disrupts – this economy:    
 
Gender is frequently operationalized as if it were the social 
construction of sex difference, that is, as if sex were a 
referent of gender. For instance, one recent definition 
involves „usefully‟ distinguishing sex from gender as a brute 
from a social fact […]. Accordingly, sex exists 
independently of (that is, external and prior to) our 
representations of it whereas gender requires social (that is, 
collective) representation for its existence. (Kinsella, in 
Carver et. al. 2003:296, quotation marks in original)  
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In effect, sex becomes pre-discursive, whereas gender becomes the social 
representation of this foundational sex in a gender/sex/desire matrix that is 
required by – and reproduces – heteronormativity. Remaining committed to a 
feminist epistemology is one way to reject the heteronormative assumptions that 
are uncritically deployed by mainstream epistemologies and methodologies; it is a 
self-conscious way of performing IR otherwise; of exposing the power relations 
that establish a hierarchical ordering of knowledge and showing how IR produces 
the „reality‟ it claims to merely represent. In this sense, there is no such thing as 
gender-neutral knowledge: “If we consider this relation of knowledge and power 
in relation to gender, we are compelled to ask how the organization of gender 
comes to function as a presupposition about how the world is structured” (Butler 
2004:215).  
 
 
6.3 Subversive Possibilities 
 
As stated in chapter 2.2.1 of this thesis, subversive acts are “challenging, calling 
into question and/or undermining the presumption of heterosexuality.” (Chambers 
and Carver 2008:155, italics in original). Rethinking the state as performative 
while remaining within the norms that establish the state as an analytical concept 
in international politics, is one way of exposing and destabilizing these norms. In 
this sense, Kantola‟s and Shepherd‟s articles open up possibilities for subverting 
heteronormativity, but what is needed is a process of repetition whereby the limits 
of what is considered knowledge in IR are disrupted. This entails a continued 
commitment to epistemologies and methodologies that critically destabilize the 
center rather than adapt to it. What is revealed by the texts discussed above is that 
IR is not neutral, and that the discursive production of the sexed/gendered subject 
will remain hidden so long as language is understood as descriptive, and 
knowledge is legitimized in terms of its objective „scientific‟ validity. IR-
feminism is to a large extent informed by postmodern and poststructural 
understandings of sex and gender, and recognizes that the discursive production of 
the subject cannot be excluded from an analysis of international politics since 
knowledge is always productive but never descriptive. The task is thus not merely 
to subvert heteronormativity, but to subvert the limits of IR. My suggestion here is 
that this be done through a repetitive disturbance of these limits; a continuous 
production of „alternative‟ knowledge; a rejection of adaptation, even if this 
means a continued „exclusion‟ from the mainstream: “There are advantages of 
remaining less than intelligible, if intelligibility is understood as that which is 
produced as a consequence of recognition according to prevailing social norms” 
(Butler 2004:3). The subversion of both heteronormativity and the perceived 
coherence of International Relations is not just about claiming space for feminist 
knowledge production; it is also a highly conscious and political project of 
expanding the ontological human; the intelligible; the livable. It is a matter of 
recognition of those lives that is made unintelligible by the current dominant 
discourses, and of rejecting fixed subject categories of any kind.  
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This is the juncture from which critique emerges, where 
critique is understood as an interrogation of the terms by 
which life is constrained in order to open up the possibility of 
different modes of living; in other words, not to celebrate 
difference as such but to establish more inclusive conditions 
for sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of 
assimilation. (Butler 2004:4) 
 
In rejecting conventional methodology and research agendas, and established 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, IR-feminism can, through a self-
positioning at the margins of what is considered International Relations, perform 
this subversive critique and disturb the inside/outside distinction that produces IR 
as a coherent academic discipline. As opposed to neo-feminism, I would argue 
that entering the hegemonic discourse is not productive for a feminist agenda. 
There is a strength in working at the margins. And I want to stress here that this 
margin is a discursive limit; the border which constitutes the field; the space 
between inside and outside. It is not the same as an unwanted marginalization, or 
as the exclusion of the unintelligible from the ontological reality; rather it is a 
rejection of the limits of ontology and knowledge. Speaking from the margins can 
be as much a self-positioning and a way to disrupt the center and the 
inside/outside distinction as a denial to be a part of that center. It can also be a 
way of creating a new center, which in effect challenges the hegemonic position 
of the center which one is rejected from. As Audre Lorde so famously declared 
with the title The Master‟s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master‟s House 
(1984), one must adopt methods that are developed outside of the inside in order 
to positively change structures of oppression and resist politics of 
dehumanization. I maintain that the borders surrounding the inside can be 
disrupted through a performative positioning at the margins – at the space 
between inside and outside – and from here, a way of speaking can be developed 
that subverts the distinctions, the hegemonic center, and heteronormativity. 
 
 
6.3.1 Normative Critique 
 
In an article called “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault‟s Virtue” (2004b), 
Butler, following Foucault‟s reasoning in his 1978 lecture “What is Critique?”, 
argues for a normatively committed critique, one that is not dependent on the 
object which it criticizes. Rather, the critique that Butler speaks of is a critical 
attitude (Butler 2004b), related to the creation of the self as a site of resistance; a 
self-stylization that exposes the limits of knowledge and discourse. This notion of 
critique is linked to both ontological and epistemological questions concerning 
what counts as truths and knowledge, and the creation of the subject within the 
given limits of what one can know. This critical attitude is one that could serve 
IR-feminism well as a means for disrupting the limits of IR and claiming a place 
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as legitimate producers of knowledge. It may also be a self-conscious 
performance of an IR that subverts, rather than reproduces heteronormativity.  
 Butlerian critique is concerned with exposing the limits that keeps 
any discourse or field coherent and effectively separated from its outside: 
“critique will be that perspective on established and ordering ways of knowing 
which is not immediately assimilated into that ordering function” (Butler 
2004b:308). Critique, in Foucault‟s sense, is related to morals and the way that the 
subject is formed by moral obedience and prohibitions. According to Butler, he 
tries to envision a morality that is not based on prohibitions, but rather on an 
active formation of the subject, a critical attitude towards the laws we are told to 
abide by. This is a form of self-transformation where the moral categories that are 
given to us are being questioned and the limits of epistemologies are exposed; and 
new – and yet unimagined – forms of knowledge can be produced (Butler 
2004b:310, 315). This means questioning the ontological foundation of the self 
and rejecting the truth on which the own subjectivity is based; it is through this 
practice and process that the self-transformation takes place (Butler 2004b:310f). 
 A self-positioning at the margins – at the space between inside and 
outside – is one way to expose these epistemological limits, and to propose a 
rejection of the inside/outside dichotomy. As Butler states: “One of the first tasks 
of critique is to discern the relation „between mechanisms of coercion and 
elements of knowledge.‟ Here again we seem confronted with the limits of what is 
knowable, limits which exercise a certain force without being grounded in any 
necessity” (Butler 2004b:316, quotation marks in original). Where the 
construction of the inside is given a foundation of naturalness or necessity, a 
critical analysis of its presumed fixed borders exposes the unnaturalness of these 
borders and the elements of coercion that is implicit in the establishment of the 
borders. Power and knowledge works together to legitimize certain ontological 
and epistemological worldviews, and the undertaking of normative criticism is 
hence to “show how knowledge and power work to constitute a more or less 
systematic way of ordering the world” according to certain rules of acceptability 
(Butler 2004b:316). Remaining committed to a feminist (poststructural) agenda 
would effectively disturb these rules as it takes away their normalizing effect 
through the exposition of the discourses which establishes them as true. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze how and why certain forms of gendered 
knowledge and heteronormativity is (re)produced in the debate between neo-
feminism and IR-feminism in International Relations. Hence, I conducted an 
internal discourse analysis of this debate with the intention to make explicit how 
heteronormative discourses produce, and are (re)produced within, feminism in 
particular, and IR in general, as well as to explore the subversive possibilities that 
are present in the debate. I wanted to refute the idea that IR as an academic field is 
„objective‟ and „neutral‟ in the analysis of international politics. I wanted to 
disturb assumptions about „gender-neutral‟ knowledge claims, and show how 
language is always productive, but never representative. Any claims of IR being 
„outside‟ of the discursive production of subjects, identities – and the human – are 
reproductive of a knowledge that continues to exclude non-heteronormative lives 
from the ontological reality. In Gender Trouble (2006), Judith Butler states: “One 
might wonder what use “open up possibilities” finally is, but no one who has 
understood what it is to live in the social world as what is “impossible”, illegible, 
unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to pose that question” (Butler 
2006:viii, quotation marks in original). The writings of Judith Butler have been as 
much a source of personal inspiration as a theoretical framework for this thesis. 
Theoretically and methodologically, this thesis developed out of a desire to 
understand this so called reality that is studied in International Relations and to 
think it differently. The theories and methods in my analysis of the feminist 
debate in IR is a reflection of this desire. It is also a way of normative critique; a 
self-conscious placement at the margins and a rejection of conventional 
understandings of what constitutes „science‟. I have never claimed to perform an 
objective analysis; rather, I have critiqued any possibility of objectivity, 
neutrality, and representability in line with a feminist poststructural 
conceptualization of research. It is my alignment with this theoretical approach 
that led me to suggest that neo-feminism should rather be conceptualized as post-
feminism. If feminism is understood as a way of critique and of opening up for 
rethinking „reality‟, then there is nothing feminist about neo-feminism. 
Advocating a mainstreaming of gender, as this approach does, is more of a 
rejection of feminism than a development. Feminism, especially when aligned 
with poststructuralism and postmodernism, is much more that just gender-analysis 
and to reduce it to a matter of gender is to discredit it as a legitimate theory. 
Feminism‟s focus on women and gender is a way of reversing the patriarchal 
structures that have excluded women and non-heteronormative subjects from IR 
in particular, and history in general. Accusing feminism of being biased is thus to 
maintain this historical exclusion rather than reversing the hierarchical 
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oppositions that reproduces it as a natural order. The kind of analysis that is 
proposed by neo-feminism does clearly not have the same objective and in effect 
serves to legitimate both a historical exclusion and current hierarchical structures. 
 As became clear in the analysis of the debate, neo-feminism 
reproduces an understanding of IR as a coherent academic field with „valid‟ 
methods and theories that adequately measures and narrates „reality‟. In line with 
authors such as Marysia Zalewski, Helen Kinsella, and Laura Shepherd, I argue 
that this understanding of IR is actually productive of a reality that conceptualizes 
the human in terms of heterosexual gender/sex/desire coherence. The recognition 
of IR as productive rather than representative is a much needed development in a 
field that has a history of excluding one of the recognized sexes – women – 
completely from the research agenda. Feminisms, as theoretical approaches that 
simultaneously exposes IR as androcentric and makes knowledge claims that 
include – and focus on – women, is a very accessible site for subverting the 
heteronormative discourses that inform, and are (re)produced within IR, and thus 
allows for a more inclusive analysis and opens up possibilities of performing 
international politics otherwise. 
 With a grounding in feminist poststructuralism, and with a focus on 
three theoretical concepts – performativity, heteronormativity, and power – I 
began my analysis of the feminist debate in IR by posing three questions: (1) How 
do discourses on gender and heteronormativity inform the debate between neo-
feminism and IR-feminism, and how is heteronormativity (re)produced in this 
debate?; (2) What forms of (gendered) knowledge are produced in neo-feminist 
and IR-feminist texts, and what are the effects of these knowledges on the 
subject?; and (3) Why is heteronormativity and certain forms of gender 
subjectivities (re)produced in the debate between neo-feminism and IR-feminism, 
and why do these two approaches conceptualize gender and heteronormativity 
differently? I will however not present any clear cut answers to these questions for 
the simple reason that I do not believe that there are any. The purpose of my 
analysis was to make explicit the false promise of gender-neutrality that is given 
by neo-feminism and that is commonly recognized in IR, as well as to show that 
IR is not „outside‟ of discourse but is very much productive of the ontological 
assumptions that is taken for granted within this academic field. These questions 
worked as a guide in the discourse analysis of the feminist debate in IR: an 
analytical focus and a means for exposing the (re)production of heteronormativity 
in neo-feminism and highlight the subversive possibilities present in IR-feminism. 
However, some final remarks can be made, with the intention of opening up for 
further debate and „disturbance‟. Firstly, throughout the analysis of neo-feminism 
it became clear that this understanding of feminism is not really feminist at all. 
Rather, it is a rejection of feminist epistemologies and methodologies that works 
to reinforce the center of IR as a coherent field with a clear inside/outside 
differentiation. It also became clear that neo-feminism to a large extent is 
informed by a heteronormative discourse that simultaneously produces the 
ontological human as a coherent sexed/gendered subject and effectively masks 
this production through an establishment of language as descriptive. IR-feminism, 
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on the other hand, is concerned with creating epistemologies and methodologies 
that disrupt, rather than reproduce, heteronormativity and the limits of what 
constitutes knowledge in IR. This approach deploys performativity as a concept 
that is of great relevance for international politics and in effect opens up for a 
rethinking of how international relations can and should be studied.  
Secondly, in reproducing heteronormativity, neo-feminism remains 
within a heterosexual matrix that renders unintelligible those lives that do not fit 
into this matrix. The separation of sex and gender into measurable categories 
reproduces positivistic notions of what constitutes „valid research‟; it also 
establishes the ontological human as a sexed/gendered subject, and in effect 
makes invisible the lives that are not measurable in accordance with these 
categories. The logocentric understanding of language implicit in neo-feminism 
validates a knowledge based on hierarchical oppositions as foundational of a 
reality that can be measured, explained, and objectively narrated – a reality 
consisting of sexed bodies and of genders that can be read on the surface as 
representative of an „inner‟ truth. In effect, binaries such as masculine/feminine, 
rational/irrational, order/anarchy, nature/culture, and inside/outside are stabilized 
and naturalized. Furthermore, any understanding of gender as a noun denies the 
possibility of performativity and thus naturalizes sex as stable and foundational of 
the gendered subject. In effect, the thinkability of performing states is 
marginalized as it is incompatible with these „truths‟ about research and reality. 
The center of IR – and the limits of knowledge – is thus kept intact. In an attempt 
to disturb this center and these limits, IR-feminism rejects the hierarchical 
oppositions that legitimize the maintenance of an inside/outside distinction 
between mainstream IR and feminist epistemologies and methodologies. By 
arguing for an analysis of states as performative, any assumption about the state as 
foundational – or central – to international politics becomes disrupted. Instead, the 
discourses that produce the state become the focus of analysis. This is an 
important recognition, not only because it allows for a completely new 
understanding of international politics that does not assume stable, pre-discursive 
entities; but also because if the state can be recognized as discursively produced – 
as performative – then so can other aspects of the ontological reality. In effect, the 
presumed stable link between sex, gender, and desire can be subverted, which 
opens up possibilities of performing the subject in ways that are not recognized by 
prevailing heterosexual norms.   
Lastly, IR-feminism‟s conceptualization of the state as performative 
is clearly informed by a poststructural denial of pre-discursive laws that govern 
behaviors and outcomes and by a recognition of power as productive rather than 
regulatory. IR is a field that is known for its androcentrism and suspicion towards 
any feminist knowledge production; and for its strong affiliation with positivistic 
research methods. Demands have long been put on feminist scholars within 
International Relations to adapt to the recognized epistemologies and 
methodologies. But rather than accepting the coherence of IR and its presumed 
natural center, IR-feminist writers make truth claims that critically question this 
coherence and they demand recognition without adaptation. I would suggest that 
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this is a form of normative critique that serves to expose the limits of IR 
knowledge production and open up for new ways of producing knowledge 
through a performative self-positioning at the margins. Approaching IR quite 
differently, neo-feminism suggests an alignment with mainstream IR theories and 
methodologies, arguing that gender can be more efficiently and productively 
analyzed at the center than at the margins. Accordingly, neo-feminism is much 
more relying on traditional research discourses that legitimize certain modes of 
analysis while effectively discrediting others. One might argue that neo-feminism 
is largely made up of a body of research that is created in line with existing power 
relations that work to maintain a hierarchically ordered scientific structure. These 
power relations normalize gendered knowledge and heteronormativity by masking 
its productive capacities. Hence, power becomes recognized only in its regulatory 
disguise and the subversion of power relations becomes reduced to a question of 
claiming power and inclusion into already established structures and institutions. 
In effect, limits of knowledge and subjectivity – and the borders of IR and 
international politics – remain intact. As stated earlier, power is not that which 
merely regulates the heterosexual subject; it is that which produces the 
thinkability of sexuality in the first place. The same goes for thinking international 
politics, states, and IR; power produces states as central to international relations 
and the discourses that normalize the state simultaneously performs it. As long as 
IR remains intact any attempt to expose the state as performative and to open up 
the possibility of subversion will be dismissed. 
The point of asking the questions that has guided this analysis was to 
challenge the limits of what is knowable; the limits of what is recognized as 
human; as real. The international „sphere‟ is produced by the same gender norms 
that regulate the sexed/gendered subject; it is not „beyond‟ or „outside‟ of the 
discursive production of the gender/sex/desire matrix – hence, heteronormativity 
needs to be disturbed at all levels in order to make the unintelligible life 
recognized and livable. IR is not objective, and gender is never neutral. The aim 
of feminism is to challenge these assumptions of objectivity and neutrality; to 
challenge the borders of IR and the truth claims made within the confines of 
„academic research‟. IR-feminism‟s self-marginalization should in this light be 
understood as a critical attitude intended to open up possibilities of subversion – 
to make life livable for the unrecognized; the unintelligible.   
The implications of what is suggested in this thesis can be immense 
for the future development of International Relations, but what may come out of 
this critique remains unknown. Adopting a critical attitude means open up for an 
unwritten future; for knowledges that are not yet conceivable. Subversion is not a 
fast-track process to change; it is a means for exposing the assumptions that are 
currently taken for granted, and for revealing the norms that are considered 
natural as fictitious. It is also a matter of understanding power as productive rather 
than repressive and of recognizing that whatever truths we claim about „reality‟ 
simultaneously creates that „reality‟. Hence, feminism will have to continue to 
place itself at the margins – and be placed there – in order to disturb the borders of 
IR and the limits of what is knowable. In doing so, our knowledge of what 
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constitutes international politics can be expanded; previously excluded lives can 
be recognized; and „research‟ can become a matter of understanding why we 
know what we know, rather than a narrative of recognized truths. With this in 
mind, I do not want to give any suggestions on what feminist scholars can and 
should study, nor how IR should develop. For now, it is enough to say that 
remaining committed to feminist epistemologies and methodologies is one way to 
perform I/international R/relations otherwise, and to give the unrecognized access 
to the ontological reality.             
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